Living Dangerously

On the flight back from the Foreign Ministers' conference in Berlin, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stopped off in Bermuda long enough to flex his muscles in a quick swim. Two hours later he was airborne again, and at sundown, one windy day last week, he landed at Washington's National Airport for a routine welcome home. There was a whispered briefing from Under Secretary Bedell Smith, a kiss from Dulles' sister, an ambassadorial handshake from France, Britain and West Germany. Then Dulles headed for his office to map a campaign on the issue that was suddenly blowing up a home-front storm.

Dulles had gone to Berlin amid predictions that he had much to lose and little to gain. By his deft handling of European issues, and with the stout help of Britain's Eden, France's Bidault, he had exposed Russia's designs for Europe and brought Britain, France and the U.S. closer together in the face of these designs than they have been for years. But in Berlin's last hour, the Big Four had issued a communique setting up still another conference, in Geneva, Switzerland, April 26. There, with Communist China sitting in, they would discuss, first, Korea (with all nations that provided troops for the Korean war invited), then Indo-China.

On Capitol Hill, even Dulles' admirers gasped at this new date to wrestle two bears simultaneously, for if the hopes for Berlin were slim, the chances of getting out of Geneva without a mauling seemed downright perilous.

Bedrock Argument. The Four Power communique raised some questions which Dulles began to answer this week in private conferences with key Senators and Representatives. Didn't the mere invitation to Peking give Red China a new status among nations, and wasn't that a step toward de facto recognition? Not necessarily, said the State Department, calling attention to the fact that Dulles actually got Molotov to sign a clause in the communique saying that the invitation to China did not imply recognition. Moreover, China is going to Geneva not as a sponsoring power but as a government invited to discuss only two specific issues. Another question: Wasn't it a mistake to broaden the Korean discussions to include Indo-China? Dulles' answer: No, the U.S. has for a year officially viewed the Korean and Indo-China wars as "interdependent."

Dulles' bedrock argument was that if the U.S. wants to preserve its diplomatic gains in Europe, there is no way out of a subsequent conference on Asia. Molotov's aim at Berlin was to split off France from the Big Three; France's Foreign Minister Bidault was under instructions from his government to work for negotiations with Peking. It is far better--the Dulles argument continued--to have joint negotiations than to split the Big Three and have France negotiating with the Communists on its own.

Price of the Past. Any single act of diplomacy is partly the result of past decisions that cannot now be changed, partly the result of present circumstances, and partly the estimate of future conditions. The Geneva conference is the price the U.S. must pay for the stalemate armistice at Panmunjom; in its turn Panmunjom was the result of the years of failure to define the objective of the Korean war. The French are in a powerful logical position when they ask why they cannot negotiate an end to the Indo-China war if the U.S. and the U.N. could negotiate an armistice at Panmunjom. In the present, Geneva is the price the U.S. pays for having France as an ally in European defense.

Looking ahead, the outcome at Geneva depends on what the West is prepared to do about Asia. And the West does not know. Paris wants to end the unpopular Indo-China war. France's General Henri Navarre, the able French commander in Indo-China, believes the war can be won with more strength. Yet French leaders in Indo-China do not want too much U.S. help for fear that the help might provoke Communist China into open intervention. Within the Eisenhower Administration, the situation is just as confused: one faction of the State Department thinks Indo-China is not essential to Asian defenses; President Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe Indo-China must be saved, and that it can be saved by prompt corrective military measures.

Risk & Opportunity. In this confusion lies the principal reason why Geneva can be more dangerous than Berlin. The U.S. knows its mind on Europe much better than it does on Asia. Just like Panmunjom, Geneva can become an irrevocable byproduct of aimlessness unless President Eisenhower and Dulles succeed in defining objectives in Asia. If they do not, they run high risk at Geneva; if they do, the risk is lower, and Geneva takes on the look of opportunity.

Once the confusion is resolved, Dulles' bold gamble could have great rewards, for at Geneva he could conceivably carry his European success across the globe to Asia, and there nail down the Asian threat so that the British and French see its full relevance to Europe. From Geneva, all three powers and their friends might achieve the resolve to block--by "massive retaliation"--the continuing forward sweep of Communism in Asia.

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