Turnaround

Late in June, ailing Bob Taft looked at work done by the 83rd Congress and made a blunt, Taft-like observation: "It's not much of a record." Then he added: "But there was the problem of a new Government, of getting turned around." This week, as members of the 83rd were turning toward home, the two parts of Bob Taft's summation could be combined into one: the 83rd had made a slow, but not a bad start.

The Congress pushed through an impressive list of major bills (see box). By reducing spending, stopping the expansion of Government, it made the critical turnaround from 20 years of New and Fair Deals. But the 83rd took no broad, policymaking action on such basic issues as taxes, trade, agriculture and labor. These failures caused some Republican disappointment and elicited some Democratic jeers. The record of the 83rd, however, was a lesson in how hard it is to change the direction of the U.S. Government without rocking the boat.

One problem was getting the Republicans on Capitol Hill turned around to leadership after 20 years in the minority. In some fields, including much of Joe McCarthy's headline grabbing, Republicans were still acting like an opposition party. The congressional investigations of this session were examples of oppositionism-in-power. Investigators threw further light on the Communist conspiracy and on the Korean ammunition shortage, but they laid no basis for legislation, gave few constructive hints on policy.

The Fight That Didn't Happen. Loudly touted in the press last winter was a forthcoming death struggle between Eisenhower and the conservative wing of his party in Congress. To those who believed this prophecy, the big news of the session was that it failed to happen. An anti-Eisenhower Republican faction never raised its head. This was partly due to Taft's skill and loyalty, partly to Eisenhower's enormous prestige, and partly to the fragmented character of Congress.

Despite adept leadership of both parties in both houses, party discipline on both sides was weak and party lines were blurred. An extreme example of this was last week's Senate vote on an important amendment to the foreign-aid program. The majority was made up of 27 Republicans and 26 Democrats: the minority was 17 Republicans, 17 Democrats and Wayne Morse. Reformers have long deplored rigid party discipline and yearned for independent legislators. More and more in recent years, Congress has moved in their direction as the power of patronage and party machines has declined. A Light Hand on the Reins. Eisenhower apparently sensed that Congress had become so bit-shy that it would be folly for him to grab the reins with the determined grip that F.D.R. used. Had Ike tried, he might only have invited the congressional bucking that thwarted and infuriated Harry Truman. Ike adapted his tactics to the situation. He worked closely with Taft, Knowland, Speaker Martin and others--but he also went at the Congressmen one by one in a series of White House breakfasts and luncheons. The weight and prestige of the presidency, which could no longer be applied through party discipline, had to be applied in person.

On the whole, this worked. From the first session of the 83rd, Ike got nearly everything he asked for. His greatest tactical victory was extension of the excess-profits tax, despite the opposition of Ways & Means Chairman Dan Reed. Ike's worst defeat was rejection of his eleventh-hour request for an increase in the U.S. debt limit. Significantly, the tactics of the debt-limit fight (see below) did not allow Ike to apply this one-by-one technique.

Waiting for Policy. Still another characteristic of the first session of the 83rd was the fact that, as in most postwar Congresses, the spotlight of world news was elsewhere--on Moscow, Seoul and Panmunjom. This was partly the luck of the news. (Congress could hardly compete with Stalin's death, Beria's arrest, Rhee's stubborn stand, or the Korean truce.) But partly it was due to the fact that the initiative in world politics is still not in the hands of the U.S. The first great steps in getting it there are not up to Congress, but to the Executive. In foreign affairs, Eisenhower has been trying to turn the Government toward a more effective policy. This was not a simple matter of Ike's "assuming leadership," like putting on a coat. The terms of leadership had to be hammered out between Ike and the Departments of State and Defense, which would have to supply the bone and muscle of policy.

As Congress adjourned, there were signs that when the legislators returned, they would find a far more positive and coherent policy to get their teeth--and their hearts--into.

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