End in Sight

After three years of fighting and two years of intermittent haggling, the Korean war neared its end, only a few thousand yards from where it had begun. There was no victory. At a staggering cost in life (including 24,000 Americans killed) and property, the United Nations had upheld a principle: aggression had been repulsed. Another principle, unification of a divided country, would have to wait.

In the boxlike wood-and-matting conference house at Panmunjom, Lieut. General William K. Harrison and General Nam II signed the "terms of reference" for an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war. The Communists gave in on voluntary repatriation, the single issue that for 17 months had stood in the way of an armistice. Here is how the P.W. plan will work:

1) Five neutral nations, Sweden. Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India, will take custody, in Korea, of the 46,380 North Korean and Chinese prisoners who say they do not want to return to their homes. Only Indian troops, armed with side arms, will stand guard.

2) For 90 days, not more than seven Communist representatives for each 1,000 prisoners will "explain to all the prisoners of war . . . their rights and ... inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life." The Communist agents will be allowed radio communication with their headquarters, but the neutral commissioners and U.N. observers will be permitted to keep an eye on all the "explaining" sessions.

3) Any prisoner who decides to return home may apply to the neutral commission for repatriation. But before he goes, a majority vote of the commission must approve his application. Possible grounds for disapproval: the belief that the prisoner has been coerced into changing his status.

4) After 90 days, the political "peace conference" which will follow the armistice "shall endeavor to settle" the question of the P.W.s who have not applied for repatriation.

5) The crux of the matter. If the conference fails to settle the question in 30 days, "any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated . . . shall be changed from the P.W. status to civilian status by declaration of the neutral nations repatriation commission." Thereafter, "those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the neutral nations repatriation commission and the Red Cross Society of India."

The Reds had also agreed to the principle that "no force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war to prevent or effect their repatriation." If the neutral nations do their job well (and it is up to them to do it: the U.N. Command will no longer have any power or responsibility in the matter), reluctant prisoners will be able to sweat out four to six months of further imprisonment, resist the blandishments (or implied threats) of their Red compatriots, and then be free men. Though the Communists might deny forever that they had accepted the principle of voluntary repatriation, the simple truth was that they had.

Now remained the redefinition of the cease-fire line. The U.N. has recently lost more ground than it gained in the 18 months since the line was first drawn, but nowhere has the line of contact moved more than half a mile. Renegotiating the line appeared to be a simple task. But U.S. officers in Korea were already looking forebodingly to the appalling problems of supervising and enforcing the truce arrangements.

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