Sounding Board

In the month since "Engine Charlie" Wilson's defense budget had been sent to Congress, the Eisenhower Administration had grown steadily more nervous over the violence of the opposition to the proposed $5 billion cut in Air Force appropriations. Major General "Jerry" Persons, the President's liaison man with Capitol Hill, had put in long hours trying to coax dissatisfied Congressmen back into line. Dwight Eisenhower himself had thrown the weight of his military prestige behind the air-power cut in a nationwide radio speech. Last week, fighting to stave off the possibility that Congress might decide to rewrite the budget, the Administration seized on the notion of using public hearings of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee as a sounding board for Wilson and his program.

First to testify was Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, who put up a dutiful but unenthusiastic* defense of Wilson's decision to cut the Air Force buildup target from 143 to 120 wings. The goal of 120 wings by December 1955 was only an "interim" matter, he emphasized, and it might well be raised once Eisenhower's appointees to the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed their planned review of the whole U.S. military position. And while the Air Force is to be allowed only the manpower and air bases necessary for the 120-wing "interim" goal, aircraft purchases would still be geared to the 143-wing target. This would give the Air Force more planes than it could man, but the extra craft would be transferred to the Air National Guard and Air Reserve.

Cool Criticism. Talbott was followed in the witness chair by outgoing Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, the man principally responsible for the rise of air power to predominance in U.S. strategic planning. Vandenberg spent the better part of three days ticking off criticisms of the Wilson budget in cool, unemotional tones.

Items:

P: "As recently as March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated to the Secretary of Defense that any reduction of the program of 143 wings . . . would increase the risk to national security beyond the dictates of national prudence."

P: "Six months ago our program of expansion and modernization was progressing in an orderly manner, and there was no reason to doubt that we could attain 143 modern wings before December 1955." Today, because of personnel and construction limitations, "even though we were to get the money, we couldn't get 143 wings until 1957."

P: "This decision to purchase the combat aircraft for 143 wings in a program limited to 120 wings . . . leaves most of these airplanes without units, people or bases, and the only alternative is to store them." Even the extra planes to be transferred to the Air National Guard would not be part of the ready Air Force. "With the kind of warning we expect to get of a Soviet atomic attack, the defense and strategic wings must be ready, some of the crews in planes at the end of the runway . . ."

High Tribute. Though he gave not an inch in his opposition to the Administration's plans for the Air Force, Airman Vandenberg maintained military correctness, and was especially careful to avoid a direct criticism of his commander in chief. When Maine's Margaret Chase Smith asked if he thought the Wilson budget adequate for national defense "in view of the fact that President Eisenhower has given assurance publicly that it is," Vandenberg suggested that she rephrase the question. Only after Senator Smith had eliminated the reference to Eisenhower did he answer: "I do not believe it is adequate."

This minor evasion left Mrs. Smith no less pleased with Vandenberg. Said she: "I compliment you on the courage and candor of your answers." And as the general finished his testimony, Alabama's Senator Lister Hill burst out in high tribute: "The most patriotic action I have seen in my 30 years in Congress."

Flat Denial. This week Secretary Wilson got in his licks before the committee. Flatly denying Vandenberg's implication that present plans would leave the U.S. with a "secondbest Air Force," Wilson gibed at "the narrow, restricted vision with which the 143-wing program is often advanced." The proposed defense budget, he said, would provide enough money to keep the U.S. strong "if the military will turn around and get at the job." The real trouble, he implied, lies in Air Force mismanagement and extravagance. Said Wilson: "I guess it's an old military trick when civilians push them a little to take something out that can't be spared."

Wilson and Talbott between them had presented the first reasonably coherent rationalization of the Air Force cuts which Congress had yet heard, and the odds were that the Administration would eventually push its defense budget through. But it would be a long time before the U.S. would forget Hoyt Vandenberg's unqualified warning.

* Three weeks ago, at a White House bridge game, Ike led off by remarking to Talbott: "I understand you're not supporting the budget." Shaken by the steely presidential eye and the dangerously soft tone of the presidential voice, Talbott hastened to assure Ike that he planned to go along with the budget despite his distaste for the slash in Air Force funds.

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