Appointment in Bermuda

Although this is the age of psychological warriors and public-opinion surveyors, the most astute diplomacy is often just what comes naturally. Last week the U.S. sponsored, and committed itself to attend, a three-power conference with Britain and France in Bermuda in late June. In its broadest meaning, the conference was an astute piece of diplomacy because it headed off, for at least a month, the premature demands in Western Europe for a four-power talk with the Russians. But it was astute mostly because it was what came naturally.

For weeks Dwight Eisenhower has been thinking that it might be wise for the Big Three to get together. Last April 15, the day before his foreign-policy speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (TIME, April 27), the President called up Britain's Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill and France's Premier Rene Mayer to brief them on his message. During the transatlantic phone talk, there was mention of a Big Three meeting. It was all very tentative. Eisenhower felt that the timing for such a conference was not yet right.

Seized Initiative. Last week the time sequence finally fell in place. In a phone call from Paris, relayed to Eisenhower through Ambassador Henri Bonnet in Washington, France's Premier Mayer said he was about to propose publicly a meeting of France, Britain and the U.S. The French were anxious about Russian designs on Germany in the face of sharp Anglo-American differences (and Mayer was worried about keeping his government afloat--see FOREIGN NEWS). The President sent back word to Mayer that he heartily approved.

Then Eisenhower got to thinking. If France proposed a conference it might seem another preliminary to a Four-Power session with the Russians (which the U.S. does not want until it sees proof by deeds of new Russian good intentions). Why shouldn't the U.S. seize the initiative for a three-power conference? This would not necessarily imply any forthcoming conference with Russia. It would imply what was true, to wit, that there are distressing evidences of diverging Big Three policies, e.g., the Churchill and Attlee speeches, which needed talking over.

The President tried out his idea on his advisers. Then, after dinner, he put in a transatlantic call to Sir Winston Churchill. It was towards midnight in London, but the old Prime Minister was still up, and delighted at the proposal. He suggested Bermuda as a conference site, agreed that late June (after the coronation, and after an Eisenhower trip to the Midwest) would be fine. Eisenhower phoned Mayer, who was pleased too, although he dropped out of the picture the next day when his government was overthrown.

"Deeds, Not Words." On Thursday the conference was announced simultaneously in Washington, Paris and London. In the House of Commons, Laborite Leader Clement Attlee asked whether the Bermuda meeting would be preliminary to "a talk with Mr. Malenkov." Answered Churchill: "Yes, sir. It is my main hope that we may take a definite step forward to a meeting of far greater import." In the National Assembly, Mayer said: "The aim . . . will be to define . . . unity of views on the problems to be debated during a four-power meeting . . ." But Washington leaks insistently denied that the Big Three conference was necessarily a preliminary to anything. And from New Delhi, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had been kept posted on the Bermuda arrangements, repeated that the U.S. still wants "deeds, not words" before sitting down to talk with the Kremlin's new masters. He specified three deeds: a truce in Korea, an end to aggression against Laos in Indo-China and an Austrian peace treaty.

At Bermuda, the U.S. will be hard pressed by its European allies to step down from its "deeds, not words" position. Churchill firmly believes that the West should seek talks with Moscow on the highest level. Just as firmly he believes it is time for Britain, France and the U.S. to settle their policy on Korea, Formosa and Communist China.

Strong Pressures. President Eisenhower will be under strong pressure from both the Europeans and liberal domestic pressure groups to settle for peace at a reduced price in Korea--and eventually to recognize, and welcome into the United Nations, Communist China. On the other hand, he will be on notice by powerful leaders of his own party, e.g., California's Senator William Knowland, chairman of the Republican Policy Committee in the Senate, that they will break openly if he yields in Asia. This tough position is likely to be supported by Eisenhower's new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a firm Asia hand.

It was left to Moscow, at week's end, to provide the Big Three conference with the proper atmosphere for settling Western differences. First Pravda warned that a Big Three conference was likely to heighten international tension. Then the Moscow radio rejected the West's invitation to reopen the Austrian treaty talks. Apparently Pravda was really worried about what came naturally when Western allies began bickering.

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