Footsteps Down the Hill

After nearly two years as commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, strapping General James A. Van Fleet came back to the U.S. with "a profound sense of frustration." His testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee about the Korean ammunition shortage (TIME, April 13 et seq.) made clear some of the reasons for the frustration. This week, in the first of two articles written for LIFE, Van Fleet gives a grim warning to the U.S. against the way the U.S. is conducting the Korean War. "We have made terrible mistakes in Korea. We may be in the process of making another one right now. In the present peace talks with the Chinese Reds, I am absolutely convinced, we run the risk of throwing away the future of our nation."

The first few weeks of his command in Korea, recalls Van Fleet, were "among the greatest in the history of the U.S. Army." In April 1951, the Eighth Army, which Van Fleet found "fresh, hard and wiry." heroically fought far larger Communist Armies, and brought them to a standstill. In May the U.N. forces threw back another offensive, then counterattacked. For a few days while the Chinese retreated in disorder. Van Fleet saw total victory within his grasp. "Then our Government's high policy intervened, and we were ordered not to advance any farther . . .

Why Less? "While we missed our chance in May of 1951 ... we have had plenty of chances since. While I was in Korea, opportunities presented themselves again & again where I was fully aware of my chance to beat the Reds once & for all and was restrained only by high policy.

"The opportunity is still there today."

Van Fleet's basic question: "Why, when we are so thoroughly and completely superior to the Chinese Reds in North Korea, do we even consider anything less than a genuine [Asia-wide] peace?" Part of the answer, he believes, lies in a general misappraisal of Chinese military power and potential.

"The first mistake all of us made in Korea and in Washington was to overestimate the strength of the Red Chinese armies, which attack with far more fury than staying power. This first erroneous judgment . . . has created a state of mind which has plagued us throughout the war and is still plaguing us in the peace discussions."

Right War. The Chinese also face a crippling supply problem, says Van Fleet.

"The logistics of a prolonged attack [against U.N. forces] are beyond the capacity of the Red Chinese army . . . The war in Korea is costing the Chinese Reds much more than it is costing us. They cannot stand the expense . . . The enemy is having a hard time supplying himself for even a sitdown war. If we ever put on some pressure and make him fight, we give him an almost insoluble tonnage problem.

"All we have to do is start an all-out effort in Korea, and the Reds will soon come begging to us."

Van Fleet offers no comfort to those who believe U.S. intervention in Korea was a mistake from the start. "In terms of high strategy." says he, "the Reds have lost the war in Korea, and they know it . . . The fact is that if we have to have a war with the Reds anywhere--a choice they themselves have made in this instance--Korea is for us the right war in the right place at the right time."

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