Stretch-Out

Gathering in Paris' Palais de Chaillot last week for the first full-dress NATO meeting since the change of administration in Washington, diplomats of the North Atlantic alliance thought they scented some changes in U.S. policy. They were quite right.

"We do bring a somewhat fresh point of view." said U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. "We believe that it is important to operate NATO for the long pull, rather than merely for the short-range pull."

Creaking Economies. What was "fresh" was not the point of view but the U.S.'s acceptance of it. For the four years of NATO's muscle-stretching, budget-straining effort to throw up a defense against Soviet might, the allies' diplomatic and military experts worked on the "crash" theory of buildup--the policy of amassing the greatest possible strength in the shortest possible time, on the assumption that the year of crisis with Russia, "the year of maximum exposure," was near at hand. (In 1948 the hypothetical year of crisis was 1952; in 1949 it was 1954; last year it was 1956.) As their economies began to creak and their political supporters to groan under the strain, European leaders tried to persuade Dean Acheson & Co. to spread the effort thinner over a longer period. Winston Churchill was roundly condemned in the U.S. last year for proclaiming a stretch-out. Now the U.S. talked the same language.

"Actually," said Dulles. "I think it is unwise to proceed on the assumption that we can forecast a general war within one or two years. I do not think that is predictable. Since it is not predictable, I do not believe that we are warranted in increasing so rapidly the military expenditure that it throws budgets really out of balance and creates an inflation which affects the value of the currency . . ."

The new policy, said Secretary of State Dulles, will mean cuts in U.S. aid to the NATO partners: "The era of the handout is over." It also means that the U.S., after years of prodding its allies and providing them leadership, has decided to "let Europeans be the pacemakers" for Western defense.

In three days around the green baize conference tables, the council took decisions that ordained the change from the "crash buildup" to the "long, hard pull." They agreed to concentrate on the "quality" rather than the "quantity" of NATO's present force of 4,000 warplanes and roughly 50 divisions (27 in the field, 18 mobilizable in 15 days, five mobilizable in 30 days). They stretched out (i.e., cut back) last year's lofty Lisbon targets, meaning that NATO will now grow to about 70 divisions and 7,000 warplanes by the end of 1954, instead of 97 divisions and 9,000 planes.

German Spectators. Despite all the relaxing talk of the benefits of "cruising speed," the fact is that the project so crucial to NATO's success, the European Army, is stalled; none of its six European member nations has ratified it, nearly a year after all six nations agreed to it and initialed it.

"The missing element in making Europe defensible at this time," said Dulles, "is the lack of any German forces." Those who oppose the European Army, with its twelve German divisions, have proposed no alternatives, said Dulles. "The theoretical alternative is that Germany might be made a member of NATO and re-create its own national forces, but, of course, the French have a veto, and I am told that they would be even more opposed to that than ... to the European Army." The U.S. could not keep large forces in an indefensible Europe. "I do not believe that the Americans are going to send a great many troops over here to fight and die protecting Germans while the Germans sit by as spectators," said Diplomat Dulles, and he added bluntly: "Perhaps the French will feel like doing that, but the Americans do not."

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