Good Business

At Washington's National Press Club one day last week, capital newsmen gathered to have lunch with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard Austen Butler. For a green vegetable the club chef had provided Brussels sprouts, a depressing staple of the depressing British austerity diet. Said Eden to his hosts: "I did feel you have tried to make me feel at home when I got to those Brussels sprouts. I thought to myself, 'Well, here are some Americans who just can't forget Britain.'"

It was to make sure that Americans would not forget Britain's economic plight that Eden and Butler had come to the U.S. "Rab" Butler succinctly stated the British mission's purpose. Said he: "Our Commonwealth . . . decided that we were out to widen trade . . . and they have not asked for extended preferences or putting a ringed discriminatory fence around the Commonwealth. Well, now that is a definite and important decision, and I think it deserves some response.

"It takes two to make love and it takes two partners to make trade . . . Unrequited love or unrequited exports are equally unsatisfying."

Nothing Asked. Both Eden and Butler were careful to emphasize that "we are asking nothing from you." They had simply come over to acquaint the Eisenhower Administration with the economic proposals born at last December's conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers (TIME, Dec. 15). For four days, the 31-man British mission explained their plans to Administration representatives. While Butler concentrated his fire on Budget Director Joseph Dodge, Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, Eden spent part of his time discussing the international situation with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower.*

Out of the meetings came two Anglo-American joint communiques. The economic communique, as had been expected, consisted primarily of an expression of agreement on the need for expanding world trade.

The political communique, however, got down to specifics. Its most important provisions :

1) The U.S. agreed that Britain could not be expected to make any more concessions toward settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.

2) Britain agreed to tighten her restrictions on shipments of strategic goods to Red China.

Unexpected Concession. Tightening of the British embargo against Red China was an important and unexpected concession. Britain had pretty much conformed with the U.N. resolution of May 1951, which urged U.N. members not to ship such items as arms and petroleum to Communist China. She had continued to provide the Mao regime with medicines, fertilizer, textiles and light machinery. Some of these goods would now be added to the list of forbidden "strategic materials." Under the new agreement, too, British ships will no longer carry to China strategic materials from non-British countries nor will British ports refuel foreign ships carrying such goods to China.

Though Eden made it clear that Britain did not intend to abandon diplomatic recognition of Mao Tse-tung, the new agreement on trade with Red China removed one of the most dangerous conflicts between British and American Far Eastern policy. Even those Americans who still hold to an almost superstitious dread of the subtle cunning and persuasiveness of British diplomats had to admit that this time the U.S. had done a good, if belated, piece of business.

*After a White House luncheon for Eden, reporters asked Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith if he had any comment on the meeting. "Sure," grinned "Beedle." "One of those goddam statesmen stole my hat."

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