The Slowdown

Crowded round a green baize U-shaped table in Paris' Palais de Chaillot, 42 foreign, defense and finance ministers of the 14 NATO nations last week sought agreement on how much the West should spend on defense in 1953. The debate was wordy, but the sense of the meeting was plain: a majority of those present believe the time has come for a thorough reassessment of NATO.

"Remote & Receding." France, whose strength in Europe varies inversely with the size of the French Army's difficulties in Indo-China, wanted the conference to recognize NATO interest in that area, and the ministers agreed. They urged all NATO governments, notably the U.S., to lend "continuing support" to the "valiant and long-continuing struggle" which has so far cost France $3.6 billion and the cream of her officer corps.* At last the war in Indo-China, too long derided as a colonial struggle, was recognized for what it is: a trial of strength against Communism, second in importance only to Korea.

The British brought up an even more basic problem: Should NATO prepare for a long-drawn-out Cold War, on the assumption (endorsed by no less an oracle than Winston Churchill) that the danger of Soviet attack is "remote and receding?" Or should the plans be drawn for an imminent Hot War, in which one division in the field is worth five in planning? Soldiers thought that kind of talk should only be heard after a minimum defense has been created. Diplomats reported that yes, they think they can detect a gradual relaxation in Russian pressure. Economists agreed that Europe's brittle economy cannot stand the strain of faster rearmament.

Window Dressing? The diplomats and economists prevailed. "We have to do what we can do, not what we'd like to do," said Dean Acheson, representing the U.S. at his last big international conference. Without admitting it, the 42 ministers abandoned the goals set in their famed Lisbon Conference last February, shrugging off their talk of 70 divisions by 1953 as mere "window dressing" designed at the time to impress the U.S. Congress. The ministers cut in half the soldiers' urgent request for $420 million to continue construction of NATO airfields, radar network and jet-fuel pipelines. And although all NATO nations were pledged in advance to increase their arms budgets in 1953, the ministers avoided setting targets which they might get blamed for missing.

Apathetic Resignation? None of this means that NATO is falling apart, or even badly faltering. But to NATO Supreme Commander General Matthew B. Ridgway it was a bitter disappointment. "As the responsible military commander," he told a graduating class of SHAPE officers the day after the conference broke up, -"I reject as unjustifiably dangerous the view that potential aggressors do not want war, are not ready for war and will not precipitate war: that we are in for a long cold war and, therefore, should adjust our plans . . .

"There can be no excuse for ... lessened effort, slower tempo, reduced goals and apathetic resignation . . . My responsibility for the military defense of the NATO nations of Europe is not qualified. I am not told to defend just parts of them and their peoples. Nor am I told that my responsibility is to become effective at some future date. I have it today."

-Total U.S. aid for the war in Indo-China so far: 34% of the total cost.

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