Report on Korea

Many--perhaps a majority--of Britons expected Field Marshal Earl Alexander's fact-finding tour of Korea to become a fault-finding tour. They could not have been more wrong.

As Minister of Defense, Alexander had been dispatched by a Britain concerned about what it considered U.S. intransigence at Panmunjom, its ineptitude at Koje, and its indifference to the lawlessness of Syngman Rhee. After inspecting the battlefield and talking to U.S. officers, Alexander gave an entirely different military estimate: "Very well organized, well prepared, very satisfactory."

Visiting Koje Island, he found that Brigadier General "Bull" Boatner had done an able job of restoring order to the prisoner-of-war camp. Calling on Syngman Rhee with British Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd, Alexander had what he called "a very friendly chat." Actually, Alexander and Lloyd were plain distressed by Rhee's highhandedness, but, reporting back to the British Foreign Office, Lloyd reluctantly conceded: "Rhee is clearly most astute and, in spite of his age, is head and shoulders above any of his compatriots whom I have met."

In Edmonton on the way back, Alexander told Canadians: "The people in England have been awfully ignorant of what is happening over there." In Washington, he told Americans, "I think you're running a good show."

His report to the British people, cabled to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, went into details:

P: Churchill's proposal to include a British delegate in the U.N. truce team was taken up with Mark Clark, who was agreeable to the plan. But Alexander himself advised against it because 1) the Americans are taking what he thinks is a correct line, 2) the Reds might interpret the addition of a British representative as evidence of Anglo-U.S. friction.

P: Alexander thinks an armistice unlikely. He passed on the opinion of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida: Mao Tse-tung has no wish to recall his veterans to China, where many would probably desert.

P:He thinks a full-scale Red offensive also unlikely, although the Chinese could break through locally. To launch a successful counteroffensive, the U.N. would need reinforcements.

Alexander's thorough endorsement of the U.S. handling of Korea came as a complete surprise to most Britons. Their ignorance testified to the inadequate, and often biased reporting of the Korean war by the British press which, with some exceptions (e.g., the Times, the Economist) gloats over U.S. failures and sloughs off U.S. successes. The British government, too, was partly to blame: it had neglected to keep Britons posted on events in Korea, and had sometimes seemed to be in the dark itself.

Tories, some of whom crustily believe that the "more experienced" British would have handled things better, reacted to Alexander's report with an audible gulp, then stressed--a little belatedly--that the U.S. and Britain have really always seen eye to eye on events in Korea. Bevanites, who argue that the U.S. has deliberately fouled up truce negotiations, were shocked and incredulous: any stick will do to beat the Americans. But since Britons far & wide admire and respect their Defense Minister, it looked as if some attitudes would have to be revised.

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