Monday, Jun. 02, 1952

Man in Mid-Passage

Leaving the appalling mess of the Korean truce talks and the prisoner-of-war issue behind him, Matthew Bunker Ridgway headed for his new job: Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe. When his Air Force Constellation touched down at Washington's National Airport one evening last week, Matt Ridgway, a four-star general in midpassage, had a chance to talk to his bosses about the gloomy past and the hopeful, dangerous future.

He walked briskly down the gangway with pretty Mary Ridgway and three-year-old Matthew Jr. Then the general was whisked off behind sirens to touch all the main bases in Washington.

Sight & Sound. First there was a private talk with Commander in Chief Harry Truman at the White House, then a nostalgic trip aboard the President's private train to West Point's 150th anniversary ceremony (where Ridgway got his second oak leaf cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal). At midweek he disappeared behind the closed doors of the Senate Armed Services Committee, later went on to Fort McNair for a special military review and reception. Next day, trim in his suntans, he addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. Twenty-four hours later he spoke to a joint session of Washington's three top press clubs.

At all of his public appearances, his audiences were impressed by his pleasant voice, his modesty and his alert, military bearing. But after he had talked, they could remember very little of what he had said. Generally, Ridgway left the impression that the Administration's decisions on Korea had been just about flawless, that the MacArthur policies (although he never mentioned the name) would have been a mistake, and that the U.S.

Eighth Army was amply strong enough to turn back any Communist offensive in Korea.

Unchanging Objective. But in private, Ridgway was somewhat franker. At week's end the Senate Armed Services Committee released a censored account of its interview with Ridgway. Items:

P: Hostile forces, built up during the truce negotiations, now have "a substantially greater offensive potential than at any time in the past."

P: While the U.N. command still can inflict "a very severe defeat" if the Communists attempt a "major offensive," its relative combat strength "is perhaps not as favorable as it was a year ago."

P: It is "an unchanging Communist objective to obtain control of the entire Korean peninsula"--whether "this year, or five or ten years hence." The loss of Korea would "very definitely" threaten the security of Japan and "vitally menace the military security of the American people."

In answer to a question about Communist diversionary tactics, General Ridgway replied with one of the basic truths of his time: "Everything these people do all ties into one over-all plan . . ." If the general from Tokyo would remember that simple fact when he took over his new job in Paris, his European mission might work out better than his last assignment.

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