Peace Without Illusion

When the Kaiser's Germany was beaten, the victors rejoiced in an old, simple and true belief that it is good to tear down the mighty who abuse their strength. That was not, however, the whole truth about World War I. Germany had been invited on the path of conquest by the weakness east and west of her borders.

In the years that led to World War II, the guilt of the weak was even more apparent. The outside world was no more Hitler's victim than it was its own. Divided, hesitant, cynical and lazy, it let the evil grow and smoothed the way to catastrophe.

This week the U.S., Britain and France made another pact with Germany (see INTERNATIONAL). This one, at least, lacked the fatuous overconfidence of the last. Victors and vanquished were far more keenly aware of the dangers ahead. The fact of the peace itself and all the terms of the contract were influenced by the threat of Communist aggression. If the West's strength and unity grew, the threat was less; if the West fell apart or stagnated, the threat would grow.

Germany itself was the index of the future. It would have nothing to gain from deserting a strong and united anti-Communist world. If might, however, be tempted to use its great vigor aggressively again, or to make another deal with the Reds if the Western alliance faltered.

How well the alliance would work was largely up to its leader, the U.S. It would have to avoid the illusion of safety, the guilt of weakness.

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