One-Star Hostage

One day last week Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, commander of the U.N. prison camp on bloody Koje Island, was standing at the gate of Compound 76, talking to a group of prisoners inside, most of them hard-core Communist North Koreans. With him was one of his staff, Lieut. Colonel Wilbur Raven. As they talked, the compound gate was opened to let a work detail out. Suddenly a group of prisoners darted out, seized the two U.S. officers, and started to drag them into the barbed-wire enclosure. Raven saved himself by clinging to the gatepost until U.S. guards rushed to his rescue; even then the prisoners would not let go until one had been bayoneted in the face.

Dodd was spirited away to some hideaway inside the compound. It was equipped with a straw mat, a built-in bunk, even a vase of flowers. The Reds showed at once that they had not only planned the coup carefully in advance but counted on its success. Within minutes of Dodd's abduction, they began displaying large banners: "We captured General Dodd. If our problems are resolved, his security is guaranteed. If there is brutal act or shooting, his life is in danger."

Thus began the most bizarre and humiliating (to the U.S.) of the innumerable Communist rebellions on the prisoners' island of Koje.

Prisoner Rule. General Dodd is a candid, friendly man who has admitted openly that he does not understand Communists. A 52-year-old, Indiana-born West Pointer, he is a former deputy chief of staff of James Van Fleet's Eighth Army. After Koje's most violent riot last February, he was sent to the island to take over command from Colonel Maurice Fitzgerald. He found a bad situation. U.S. personnel were reluctant to enter some of the fanatical Communist compounds. The Communists elected their own leaders and councils, ran their enclosures like self-contained Red fortresses, organized their own drills and classes, flew illegal Communist flags, established liaison with other compounds, engaged in forbidden trade with Koje natives. Once before, they had seized Colonel Raven, held him for three hours, complained of their food and tried to force him to eat some.

Compound 76 and several others successfully resisted the screening of Communist and non-Communist prisoners, in spite of the appearance of completeness in the balloting figures which the U.N. published last month. It was a half-promise to talk about screening that brought General Dodd to the gate of Compound 76 last week.

"Immediate Ceasing." The Eighth Army sat on the story of Dodd's kidnaping for two days, then released the bare facts. Brigadier General Charles F. Colson was rushed to the island to take command. At Communist request and on Colson's orders, a telephone was passed through the barbed wire of Compound 76 and connected to a sentry box at the gate. Over this line General Dodd sent frequent bulletins on his treatment and on his parleys with his captors. He said they were treating him fine. U.S.-cooked meals were sent in to him.

The Communists demanded: 1) 1,000 sheets of writing paper; 2) a "medical representative" to stand by; 3) admission of ringleaders from other compounds to Compound 76 for strategy conference. These demands were granted. Then came the real Communist ultimatum. It demanded an end of screening of prisoners and a stop to "voluntary repatriation." And it demanded:

"Immediate ceasing the barbarous behavior, insults, torture, forcible protest with blood writing, threatening, confine, mass murdering, gun and machine-gun shooting, using poison gas, germ weapons, experiment object of Abomb, by your command. You should guarantee P.W. human rights and individual life with the base on the international law."

Assurances. To this Communist-line collection of false charges, General Colson replied surprisingly:

". . . I do admit that there have been instances of bloodshed where many prisoners of war have been killed and wounded by U.N. forces. I can assure you that in the future the prisoners of war can expect humane treatment in this camp. . .

"I can inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening . . ."

Colson said he would be willing to deal with a Communist grievance group, presumably headed by Colonel Lee Hak Koo, who seemed to be in charge of the Dodd kidnaping. But he could make no promises about voluntary repatriation as that "is being discussed at Panmunjom."

By this time, Generals Ridgway, Van Fleet and Mark Clark (who took over the U.N. command during the trouble) were thoroughly indignant. Washington had been consulted, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately started directing the strategy on Koje. Twenty tanks were sent to the island, prepared for trouble. General Colson sent another and much firmer message to the Red rebels:

"1. You have treacherously seized and are illegally holding Brigadier General Frank Dodd. General Dodd is no longer in command of the U.N. P.O.W. enclosure, and has no authority for any decisions or actions . .

"2. You are directed to release him by [10 a.m. Saturday]. If this is not done, all necessary force will be taken to effect his release, regardless of consequences to you . . ."

Release. The Communists ignored the deadline, but they set General Dodd free --"unharmed and in good spirits," according to Van Fleet's bulletin--11 1/2 hours after the deadline, 78 hours after the abduction. Next day, wearing combat boots, fatigue cap and two pistols in his belt, Dodd was flown to Eighth Army headquarters near Seoul for a thorough chewing-out by General Van Fleet. In a press conference in which he read a statement but could not be questioned, Dodd said that any commitments made were "inconsequential."

Dodd stood little chance of getting his command back. What would happen to General Colson, who had given the Reds so handsome a propaganda weapon with his strange acknowledgment of "instances of bloodshed," was not yet known.

General Clark quickly pointed out that "bloodshed" on Koje (which had brought death to 90 Reds, one U.S. soldier) had invariably been provoked by Communist uprisings. Also, with what seemed to be special reference to the incredible promise made by General Colson to the Communists--that all screening of prisoners would stop--General Clark issued a statement saying that Colson's promises had been extracted under duress and by blackmail. The implication was that they would not be honored.

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