Peace in a Package

For the first time since February, the full Korean truce teams on both sides met together. Around the Panmunjom conference table duly appeared eight generals and two admirals, with 46 aides and advisers in the background. Reporters were hustled out of earshot, and censors told to strike out of their copy any hint of the nature of the negotiations.

But Washington had already leaked the subs1) the U.N. is willing to trade 70,000 diehard Communist prisoners for 12,000 U.N. prisoners, a figure which apparently does not include all of the South Koreans held by the Communists; 2) it will not accept Russia as a member of the armistice inspection commission, but will settle for Poland and Czechoslovakia; 3) it will agree to let the Communists go on building airfields during the armistice.

This was a considerable surrender on Item 1; seemingly it involved abandonment by the U.N. of tens of thousands of South Koreans now in Communist hands. It was also a complete surrender on Item 3. The deal was presented as a "final" take-it-or-leave-it package offer. But the Reds soon made it clear that package deals are unknown in the Communist supermarket. They insisted that the U.N. should also deliver the 100,000 Chinese and Korean prisoners who have declared that they will fight against repatriation. Since this is clearly out of the question, the talks bogged down completely. The Reds seemed unwilling to compromise on anything, and yet reluctant to break off talks. The U.N. was equally reluctant to break off, though final offers are presumably meant to be final.

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