Substantial Achievement

NATO Substantial Achievement In Lisbon's sunny setting, the top diplomats of the free world last week burst out with unexpected optimism. "Dawn is breaking," said Dean Acheson of the U.S., "and a new day is dawning for all of us." Proclaimed Britain's Anthony Eden: "The beginning of a new era."

They had gathered in Lisbon for the ninth meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance. Perhaps the dark they had just been through made them overeager to proclaim the dawn. Yet their optimism was also grounded in substantial achievement. Without bickering or hesitation, the 35 foreign, defense and finance ministers' of the 14 Western allies had: P: Endorsed for the first time German rearmament and the long-proposed European Army. This cleared the way for the continental six--France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg--to negotiate a treaty fusing their armed forces into an internationalized, one-uniform army of 2,000,000 men, 6,000 warplanes. P: Agreed to spend $300 billion for mutual defense in the next three years--the greatest peacetime and peace-policing buildup in history. On paper, that means 50 divisions and supporting forces by the end of 1952, perhaps twice that (including twelve German divisions) by the end of 1954. Each of the 14 NATO partners (including the U.S.) agreed to submit to NATO scrutiny and criticism its annual defense budget and production targets.

The council also decided to set up its headquarters in Paris, and to make Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador in Washington, NATO's Secretary General.

The sun and Portugal's Strongman Antonio Salazar did their joint best to brighten the conference. The flashiest of Salazar's honor troops turned out for the guests. Lampposts gleamed with fresh paint. As a final measure of thoughtfulness the government clapped the city's 400 beggars into jail for the duration of the conference. But what helped most was some smart advance diplomacy.

Things looked darkest for the European Army just before the NATO session began (TIME, Feb. 25). Then four men gathered in London. Sitting down with Lisbon's Big Three--Acheson of the U.S., Eden of Britain, Schuman of France--was a man who was not even invited to Lisbon: Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. They met because West Germany's price for joining the European Army had collided head on with France's price for letting Germany in.

Plotting Ways Out. If any two men could bury the age-old Franco-German rivalries, it was Schuman the German-speaking French Catholic from the Moselle Valley, and Adenauer the French-speaking German Catholic from the Rhine Valley only 75 miles away. With a prod from Acheson and Eden, they sat down to reconcile the conditions imposed on them by their own parliaments.

Problem: how to satisfy French demands for a restriction on German armaments without irritating the Germans, who want to live as equals since they will be asked to die as equals. Solution: eliminating the clauses in the German occupation statute which ban German production of atomic weapons, guided missiles, submarines, aircraft and other major weapons. In return, Adenauer agreed to let the European Army's international hierarchy decide what Germany, as well as other nations, will make. This hierarchy will not ask Germany to make the more advanced weapons.

Problem: how to allocate Germany's contribution to the European Army. Britain insisted that West Germany must keep contributing toward the cost of British troops in Europe, as she now does under the occupation. But West Germans consider such a payment another proof of inequality. Solution: all of Germany's financial contribution will go into the European Army treasury; British troop costs will come out of the common kitty.

Problem: how to handle Germany's demand for NATO membership. The Germans want a seat on NATO's council; other NATO powers (particularly the French) don't want her in. Solution: Germany will get a seat and a veto on the European Army council, but not in NATO. She will also get the standard NATO guarantee--that an attack on one is an attack on all.

From Down to Up. With these decisions made beforehand in London, and endorsed in Lisbon by the NATO council, the gloom lifted almost too easily. In Lisbon's sunlight it was hard to face the big, sobering fact: that NATO's decisions are only decisions on paper.

Within hours after Eden and Acheson proclaimed the new dawn, new difficulties came up like thunder. Britain, France and Italy made clear that they will need more American dollars. The French announced that because of their galloping inflation they will be able to raise only twelve divisions by year's end--not 14, as promised.

Limited Commitments. The optimistic men of Lisbon were handicapped by being able to commit only their governments, but not necessarily their parliaments or their people. Once the European Army treaty is negotiated, it can still be rejected by the suspicious Bundestag of

Germany or by the divided National Assembly of France. Schuman represents a government that may fall from power any day. Adenauer represents a government that cannot be thrown out until June 1953, but probably could not get re-elected tomorrow. Acheson spoke for an administration unsure of its ability to keep the all-vital dollars flowing from Congress (the known suspicions of Congress were a great help in knocking heads together in Lisbon). Eden spoke for a country whose bipartisanship in foreign policy is threatened by party differences for the first time since the war.

The immensity of the job still facing the builders of Western defense was obscured, like the beggars of Lisbon, by the convenient arrangements of the moment. But just like the beggars, who began shuffling back into the streets of Lisbon again this week, the problems of NATO will be tugging at the West's coattails for a long time.

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