"Operation Quagmire"

In a big U.S. limousine with whitewall tires, North Korea's dapper General Nam Il drew up at the Panmunjom truce site, nodded coldly to Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, and read the Communist draft for the fifth and last item on the armistice agenda. This is just a talk point--what future recommendations (not binding) shall be made to the governments concerned. Though two more important issues--safeguarding the truce and exchanging prisoners--remained to be settled, the U.N. still wanted to hear what Nam Il had to propose.

Again: Formosa. He readily obliged. The Reds want a high-level political conference within three months of the armistice signing, at an unspecified place, but with the U.N., North Korea and the "government of the People's Republic of China" represented at the table.* Nam Il made no mention of the government of South Korea. The conference first would take up the question of withdrawing foreign troops from Korea, and then deal with other problems in Asia bearing on "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question." Obviously, this involved mildewed demands for control of Formosa and for seating Red China in the U.N.

After three days in which messages crackled between the Allied truce camp at Munsan and Tokyo, Admiral Joy gave the U.N. answer. It agreed that some political action should be taken within 90 days of a truce, but insisted that South Korea should be represented. It agreed that withdrawal of troops might be considered first, but insisted that only "Korean questions related to peace" should compose other agenda items. The Reds agreed to invite South Korea, scorned the rest.

Bargaining Inertia. At this point, after seven months of futility and frustration, Matt Ridgway and his advisers--hitherto high among the optimists--felt moved to warn against unquenchable bursts of Allied optimism. In a radio bulletin, they somberly assessed, under the label "Operation Quagmire," the Communist truce tactics as exhibited since last July:

"The Communist plan throughout the last seven months has called for a temporary show of progress following each period of complete delay. The Communists have known that, at certain times throughout the talks, they must inject a certain modicum of achievement as the price for their main program of bargaining inertia. This is a part of the Communist war of nerves. Hope must be raised and dashed according to schedule . . ."

If this analysis is correct--and it seems to be--just how much longer will the Allies allow themselves to be pinned down in the quagmire by Nam Il & Co.?

* After more than a year of Red Chinese intervention, this was the first public admission that Red China has an official stake in the Korean war. Up to last week, Red China's well-disciplined and well-led troops had ludicrously but consistently been referred to as "volunteers."

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