Mr. Republican's Book

Robert Taft last week published his long-heralded book, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Doubleday; $2). It should finally dispose of the charge that Taft is an isolationist (but probably will not). It explains many Taft votes on specific issues, sharply revises many former Taft opinions, and collects in one place a rounded statement of Taft's philosophy of foreign policy.

Liberty Before Peace. "Fundamentally," he begins, "I believe the ultimate purpose of our foreign policy must be to protect the liberty of the people of the U.S." Second to protection of liberty comes "the maintenance of peace." This blunt ranking of liberty above peace is in a solid American tradition, but it is also a courageous campaign proclamation for a candidate who, through discreet silence, might capture the sizable peace-at-any-price vote from Harry Truman. It is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt's famous speech in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize when he said that he was for peace, but "peace with righteousness." And it is a vast advance over Taft's pre-Pearl Harbor statement that war would be worse than a German victory over Britain.

Liberty, Taft says, is now besieged from two directions. The first threat is clearly the menace of the Russians--"a menace greater than we have faced before in our history." The second is the danger that excessive defense demands will undermine liberties within the U.S. and lead to socialism. Politically this happens when the President assumes emergency powers which cut across the rights of Congress and individuals. Economically it happens when private enterprise is taxed into virtual Government control. The maximum budget the U.S. can safely stand, says Taft in capital letters, is "ABOUT 75 BILLION

DOLLARS." (Next year's U.S. budget estimate: $90 billion.)

Thus Taft plumps for a foreign policy that starts with defense of U.S. liberty and works outward to the limit of a $75 billion budget. To get the most for his money, he proposes a strong Navy, an "all powerful" Air Force, and an Army no bigger than 3,000,000 men. He would throw in U.S. sea and air power to protect "any island nations which desire our help," i.e., Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific, and "Great Britain of course" in the Atlantic. He would protect the Suez lifeline with troops, if necessary. He would allow the Army "occasional extensions . . . into Europe, Asia and Africa," but "I do not believe that in time of peace we should commit American troops to continental soil."

The Exceptions. Korea and Europe are temporary exceptions. Had the U.S. adequately armed South Korea and made it clear in 1949 and 1950 that the U.S. would support South Korea with air and sea power, then there probably would have been no Korean war, Taft says. The President exceeded his authority by putting troops into Korea without consulting Congress, but since they are there, they must be supported.

In Europe, U.S. arms aid should, in the long run, be sufficient to build up adequate European armies. These armies, plus the North Atlantic Treaty's promise of instant U.S. retaliation, should be enough to deter the Russians unless they are bent on all-out war. (Taft's proof: U.S. air power and its atomic bombs have deterred Russia up to now.) Ike Eisenhower has succeeded "by the force of his personality ... in persuading the European nations of the tremendous importance of arming themselves in a joint defense." But the Administration's decision to "build up a great international army on the Continent . . . with a substantial commitment of

American land troops" is something else again. Taft thinks the U.S. should keep six divisions in Europe (on the technical ground that we are occupying Germany) only until Western Europe fashions its own army.

Owning Up. Taft draws attention to certain of his own blunders, a refreshing contrast to the smoke-screen technique of the Trumanites who have never owned up to their own catastrophic miscalculations. He originally opposed the Marshall Plan, but once "the Russian threat was apparent" he was for ECA. Before Korea, he went along with the inadequate Truman reductions in the military budgets because "twelve to thirteen billion dollars a year . . . seemed a large sum to me, and I took the word of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

He is hardest put to explain his vote (in 1949) against the North Atlantic Treaty. "In spite of the fact that I approved the warning given to Russia by the ratification of the Atlantic pact, I voted against it because I felt it was contrary to the whole theory of the United Nations Charter, which had not then been shown to be ineffective."

Law & Leadership. The United Nations has "largely failed," Taft says, because its charter pays too much attention to "peace and security" and not enough to "law and justice." This is a point of the utmost importance, and one frequently ignored in discussions of international relations. Yet after making the analytical point in criticism of the U.N. charter, Taft curiously fails to develop the positive side of the essential relationship between law and justice. He seems blind to the responsibilities and opportunities of U.S. leadership. In a detached, passive and utterly unrealistic passage, he says: "It seems to me that peace in this world is impossible unless nations agree on a definite law to govern their relations . . . and also agree that, without any veto power, they will submit their disputes to adjudication and abide by the decision of an impartial tribunal."

Yet Taft holds out no prospect of "agreement among nations," and he effectively attacks proposals for world government. How, then, does the U.S. proceed to foster law and justice? Taft approves of propaganda for liberty, but seems to have little feeling for the kind of action that gives such propaganda force and body. For instance, he repeatedly says that the U.S. should not offer aid to countries which are not willing to aid themselves; he does not recognize that in many instances the offer of U.S. aid is the best propaganda for liberty and that it creates in other countries a will to resist aggression and injustice.

Taft's book is an honest effort to adjust the interests of the U.S. to the facts of a highly unsatisfactory world situation. It lacks any dynamic sense that U.S. efforts can help make the world situation less unsatisfactory. In the long run. Taft's way might cost more than 75 BILLION DOLLARS.

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