Down, Down, Down?

For a year, while Iran galloped toward ruin, the U.S. State Department has been muttering that it was working for a "settlement." Presidential Troubleshooter Averell Harriman tried hard to bring about agreement between Teheran and London, and failed. Still, the State Department's only policy on Iran is to work--or wait--for a settlement.

There is no evidence in Iran that a "settlement" is any more likely this week than it was last week or last month. One significant change in the situation: Premier Mohammed Mossadeq--who has been running the show from his cot, summoning Western diplomats, cowing the Iranian Parliament with his National Front thugs, telling the Shah where he got off--has begun to slip. Fourteen deputies last week signed a manifesto protesting the Premier's policies, deriding the fiasco of oil nationalization. Sayid Zia Eddin Tabatabai, onetime Premier and wily old politician, set up an opposition, revived his National Will Party. The Shah, who has been mum about his dislike of Mossadeq and his policies, last week made a public plea for national unity in which he said flatly that Iran was facing the worst crisis in her history.

The British imposed economic sanctions against Iran (partial blocking of Iranian sterling holdings in London, banning exports of scarce raw materials to Iran), and were evidently trying hard to squeeze out Mossadeq. Even if they succeed (despite his troubles Mossadeq, fainting fits, tears and all, is still immensely popular in Iran), it is far from likely that a "settlement" would result. Far more probable is a steady downhill slide of Iran's economy, with inflation, unemployment and rioting, exploited by the Communist Tudeh Party.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.