Proceed with Caution

For throwing his peace grenade, Russia's Malik had chosen his time well. These factors made for maximum effect: 1) it was the week in which General Ridgway had firmly asked the United Nations for more ground troops, a request that had been heard with markedly little enthusiasm; 2) it was the week in which the West had broken off Paris talks, and Russia was temporarily without a seat at any active negotiations table.

New Tone? Malik chose an innocuous U.N. radio program as his platform, delivered a 14-minute speech which promised to start off like most of his past blasts at the West. But this time, there were some differences in tone.

For one, Malik spoke to his American listeners not in Russian but in English, heavily accented but clear. For another, the speech had been stripped of the more heavy-handed terms normally used by the Russian oratory: no one was called a "lackey" or "assassin" or "barbarian."

Malik, while denouncing Western warmongers, did his dogged best repeating Soviet Russia's familiar contention that the West, not the peace-loving Communists, is driving the world to the brink of war. Said he: "The ruling circles in the United States, the United Kingdom and France are endeavoring to convince their peoples that... to maintain peace, it is necessary ... to create a so-called 'position of strength'... The policy ... contains within itself the seeds of a new world war. The North Atlantic Military Alliance ... is directed against the U.S.S.R "

The Western peoples, continued Malik, were themselves suffering "the consequences of the policy of an armaments race . . . The only people to benefit from the armaments race are those who make enormous profits from military contracts . . . The Soviet Union threatens no one . . . The efforts of the Soviet people are directed toward peaceful construction. The Soviet state is ... expanding civilian industry . . . bringing into being the giant hydroelectric power stations and irrigation systems . . .

"Hundreds of newspapers and journals in the U.S. are . . . openly calling for an attack on the Soviet Union . . . No one can name a single U.S.S.R. newspaper which called for an attack on the U.S.. . . The Soviet Union bases its policy on the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, socialism and capitalism."

Then, after thus making mincemeat of the facts, Malik casually got down to the point:

"The Soviet people further believe that the most acute problem for the present day--the problem of the armed conflict in Korea--could also be settled . . . The Soviet people believe that, as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a ceasefire, and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. Can. such a step be taken? I think it can . . ."

Opportunity? The world promptly started to buzz with truce talks. In Oslo, where he was vacationing, U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie delightedly and uncritically pounced on the Malik statement. Said Lie: "The first step . . . must be a cease-fire." The "ceasefire should involve only the military arrangements necessary to stop the fighting and to insure against its renewal . . . The political issues involved . . . can then be appropriately discussed in the competent organs of the U.N."

Canada's Lester Pearson, longtime crusader for cease-fire (and for admitting Communist China to the U.N.) suggested that it would be a "great mistake" not to follow up Malik's move. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman saw in Malik's speech a "positive element" that would permit opening negotiations.

But Britain showed more sober caution. Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison spoke of a "possible opening," but warned: "Any undue optimism would be unwise."

Washington was openly skeptical. Declared the State Department: "If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression ... we are . . . ready . . . But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than propaganda."

Trap? Propaganda or not, Mr. Malik had started something, and Washington was generally convinced he had done so because Moscow--to say nothing of China --is being hurt by the way the war in Korea is going; by its strain on Russian materiel and rear-area manpower, it has become a heavy drain on Russian prestige--and perhaps is a hindrance to other ventures. Yet obviously Moscow and Peking still hope to stop the fighting on their own terms. The terms as last stated by Peking: 1) withdrawal of all "foreign" troops from Korea, which evidently would not include the North Korean Communists, would not necessarily include all Chinese "volunteers"; 2) admission of Communist China to U.N.; 3) transfer of Formosa to Communist China.

Malik's proposal for armistice at the 38th parallel, with the rest of the issues to be taken up at the conference table, included an obvious trap for the U.N. If the proposal were adopted, U.N. forces would be pinned down in Korea as long as the Russians wanted to talk. There would be no guarantee that peace would ever be achieved or that the Chinese would not resume the fighting when it suited them.

The minimum terms on which the U.N. could hope for true peace seemed to be a complete Chinese withdrawal from the country, plus an ironclad guarantee of free elections in both North and South Korea. There seemed no chance this week that Peking and Moscow were ready to accept such terms. Both capitals, however, reported the Malik statement and Peking expressed "support."

This week Western diplomats cautiously approached Malik in Manhattan to find out how much, if anything, he had meant. Apparently less interested in the diplomatic play were the U.S. commanders in Korea, who still had a war on their hands. Said Lieut. General James Van Fleet: "Here we have business as usual, going about our military job."

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