FACTS ON FORMOSA

From October 1948 until the Korean invasion on June 25, 1950, Dean Acheson testified, the U.S. had "one policy, and one policy only" in regard to Formosa. "That policy was as follows: 1) first of all, it was understood and agreed that Formosa had strategic importance so far as the U.S. was concerned; 2) that strategic importance related to keeping Formosa out of the hands of a [hostile] power and did not concern occupying or using Formosa by the U.S.; 3) in the existing condition and strength of the armed forces of the U.S., it was not possible to commit any forces whatever ... to the defense of Formosa; 4) the State Department should, to the best of its ability, by diplomatic and economic means, try to keep Formosa from falling into hands which would be hostile to us." This is the record of how the policy was actually followed:

Sept. 23, 1949--The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered sending a military mission to Formosa. Decision: no mission.

Dec. 9, 1949--J.C.S. ruled against trying to save Formosa from the Communists. Reason: strategically the U.S. could do without Formosa. They were unanimous.

Dec. 10, 1949--Chiang Kaishek, beaten off the mainland, arrived on Formosa to set up his Nationalist government. J.C.S. began a re-examination of its policy.

Dec. 22, 1949--J.C.S. reversed its stand. This time it recommended that an attempt be made to keep Formosa from the Communists. It proposed that a small military mission, possibly 20 officers, be sent. General Douglas MacArthur and Army Under Secretary Tracy Voorhees, who had recently returned from a trip to MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters, had helped convince J.C.S. that the island should be saved.

Dec. 23, 1949--The State Department issued 456 copies of a secret document to its diplomatic missions abroad. Its message: 1) minimize the possible fall of Formosa to the Communists, 2) emphasize that "Formosa has no special military significance."

Dec. 29, 1949--President Truman presided at a meeting of the National Security Council. General Omar Bradley, representing the J.C.S. in its new stand, argued for a military mission to Formosa. Secretary Acheson opposed him, decisively defeated the proposal. Truman ruled for Acheson.

Jan. 5, 1950--President Truman told his press conference: "The United States [has no] intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present [Formosan] situation. The U.S. Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China . . . will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the U.S. Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the island." EGA help would continue.

Jan. 5, 1950--Secretary Acheson told a press conference: "There has been a great deal of amateur military strategy indulged in in regard to this matter of Formosa . . . We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the island of Formosa. So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man has ever believed that we should involve our forces in the island . . . We gave vast amounts of military equipment to that government. . . It is not that they lack rifles or ammunition ... or that they cannot purchase what they need . . . The trouble lies elsewhere, and it is not the function of the U.S. nor will it or can it attempt to furnish a will to resist and a purpose for resistance to those who must provide for themselves."

Jan. 12, 1950--Acheson, in a speech to the National Press Club, said that the U.S. "defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus ... to the Philippine Islands." Not included: Formosa.

Jan. 26, 1950--Secretary of Defense Johnson and General Bradley told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Formosa in enemy hands would be a menace to the American defense line in the western Pacific, but that they did not think the island of enough strategic significance to have U.S. armed forces occupy it.

June 27, 1950--Two days after the Korean attack, President Truman announced: "I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done."

April 24, 1951--The Defense Department disclosed that between 500 and 600 military advisers would be sent to Formosa to help train Chiang's troops. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Lovett said it now ranked with Western Europe in priority for U.S. arms.

May 11, 1951--Secretary of Defense George Marshall said: "We are very clear on that. . . Formosa must never be allowed to come under the control of a Communist government or of a government that is under Soviet Communist domination."

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