Bradley's Case

Poised and coldly emphatic, General Omar N. Bradley answered Douglas MacArthur and his arguments for extending the war in Korea by bombing sanctuary bases in Manchuria and blockading China's coast. "Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Bradley told the Senate committee, "this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy."

He read from a prepared statement. A plain, almost schoolmasterish figure in spite of his crisp summer tans and combat ribbons, Omar Bradley, topflight battlefield general (in Europe he commanded more combat troops than any military man in U.S. history), was Witness No. 3 in the MacArthur hearing.

A Question of Risk. "General MacArthur has stated that there are certain additional measures which can and should be taken, and that by so doing no unacceptable increased risk of global war will result," said Bradley. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily."

He dealt specifically with MacArthur's proposals:

On Using Chiang's Troops: "In our opinion, the Nationalist troops on Formosa had very limited capabilities, particularly for offensive action . . . Their leadership, equipment and training were all of such a state that they would be of limited use in offensive operations."

On a Naval Blockade. "It must be realized that a naval blockade is actually, and can be taken certainly as, an act of war; and in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs the naval blockade would not be effective unless it was a United Nations blockade and not just a United States blockade."

On Bombing Manchuria & China: "We do not believe the extension of [the war] by bombing would get decisive results. We have about 200 miles of enemy supply lines to workmen now and you would only extend that length back into Manchuria . . . Normally, you think of strategic bombing as going after the sources of production. The sources of production in this case are very largely out of reach of any strategic bombing because they are not even in China [i.e., they are largely in Russia]...

"Taking on Red China is not a decisive move, does not guarantee the end of the war in Korea, and may not bring China to her knees .. . [It] would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize. Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world."

Not a Directive. What about MacArthur's claim that the Joint Chiefs had once supported most of his proposals, but had been overruled by the Secretary of Defense and President Truman? "This is just not so," said Omar Bradley. Then how about the Jan. 12 document in which some of MacArthur's proposals were suggested by the Joint Chiefs? That was meant only as "possible lines of action," said Bradley, and besides it was a study, not a directive.

Wisconsin's Wiley put the inevitable question: "How would you visualize decisive results will be achieved under the present program in Korea?"

BRADLEY : "Well, to get decisive results raises many questions. I am not too sure we will get them under our present methods ; I am not too sure we would get them by expanding the war into Manchuria and China . . . All I can say is that the Joint Chiefs do not feel that you would come much nearer in getting those decisive results by extending the war into China and in taking additional risks."

New Overtone. But running through Bradley's testimony was an important overtone that had not been audible heretofore in the Administration's replies to MacArthur, even in Defense Secretary George Marshall's lengthy testimony before the Senators. Repeatedly Bradley implied that the Administration and MacArthur really disagreed more on timing than on basic strategy. Finally, he came right out and said it. "Would it be fair for me," asked Oregon's Wayne Morse, "to form the conclusion that the primary difference between the JCS and General MacArthur . . . has been a difference of timing?"

BRADLEY: "It might eventually come down to a simple question of timing. I think it goes a little bit beyond that . . . There [is] a chance of solving it without doing it."

At one point, in answer to a question about risking war with Russia, Bradley replied that it was a risk the U.S. should not take "at this time." And while the Administration had pictured the U.S. position as a defensive, counterpunching one, with the initiative in the enemy's hands, Bradley seemed to be saying the U.S. can still take the initiative. He managed in a few words to leave the future course of U.S. action in Korea wide open: "We believe that every effort should be made to settle the present conflict without extending it outside Korea. If this proves to be impossible, then other measures may have to be taken."

That, it seemed evident, was General Bradley's way of saying that the U.S. may yet decide to carry the war right to Red China, risk or no.

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