Another Peninsular Campaign

On his tenth visit to the Korean front, Douglas MacArthur summed up the military situation: "Our field strategy . . . a war of maneuver with the object of inflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible ... has worked well. [But] we must not fall into the error of evaluating such . . . successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat." MacArthur added that the mountainous terrain, outnumbered U.N. forces, and political decisions over which he had no control made "purely academic" any talk of crossing the 38th parallel now.

Nevertheless, it was clear that Lieut. General Matthew Ridgway and his Eighth Army had the situation, such as it was, well in hand. Bolstered by an aggressive defense in depth, they had broken the powerful offensive of three Chinese Communist armies down the mountainous spine of central Korea.

The repulse, as MacArthur had warned, was not necessarily decisive. The well-trained Chinese Third Army, reported in the Wonsan area, might follow up a new eastern drive of the North Koreans. But by any reckoning, a big round had gone to the Eighth Army. A few miles of real estate had been traded for a great many Communist lives.

A British journalist just returned from Peking reported: "The war in Korea . . . is already somewhat of a surprise to the Chinese." Hospitals in Manchuria, he added, could not take care of the great number of casualties. Mao Tse-tung and other Red Chinese strategists, who like to read the maxims of Sun-tzu, the ancient (500 B.C.) Chinese Clausewitz, now found themselves up against a field strategy similar to the one that had helped bring down Europe's great 19th Century aggressor.

The U.N. campaign in the Korean peninsula bore striking resemblance to the Duke of Wellington's "Peninsular Campaign" against Napoleon's armies in Spain. The Iron Duke, like Matthew Ridgway, was pitted against enemy armies of overwhelming numerical superiority, capable of getting steady overland reinforcements. Wellington's troops, like the Eighth Army, were supplied by overwhelming seapower. Wrote Wellington, describing his "war of maneuver": "If they advance against me, I shall retire before them, accepting battle if they give me a favorable opportunity, for the missile action of my lines is superior to the shock action of their columns . . ."

The Peninsular Campaign was not decisive, but it destroyed several French armies, drained France of much of its trained manpower, softened Napoleon for ultimate defeat in mass land battles (Leipzig and Waterloo) nearer home. It was also no quick war. It took the Duke five years.

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