Hill 101

BATTLE OF INDOCHINA

A will-to-win met a will-to-win last week on Hill 101 in Indo-China. When the battle was over, the will of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny dominated the field.

The Communists' will-to-win, personified in crafty Ho Chi Minh, had always been there. It was evident last week in the courage and coolness of Communist soldiers who turned their machine guns on power-diving Cobra planes strafing their hilltop position. By holding their fire until the Cobras were at the bottom of their dives, the Communists caused six to be grounded for repairs.

Esprit de Lattre. Ho's men outnumbered the French three to one. They were armed with bazookas, mortars and some artillery. Their staff work was good. They excelled in attack. Their men traveled light and fast, each carrying 500 rounds of ammunition, sometimes going without rations for 48 hours. This would have been enough in the old days to win the battle for Hanoi, French-held capital of North Viet Nam. It was no good against the new esprit de Lattre of the anti-Communist army.

As the battle pounded on last week, De Lattre flew into the French outpost of Vinhyen (see map) after it was cut off from Hanoi by the Communists. He wanted to see the battle for Hill 101 himself. He watched two French columns go into a counterattack. Fighting for him, on one flank, there was a detachment of Muongs, hill people from the "Country of the Killing Water," where they hunt pigs with bows & arrows. Now, armed with rifles, they were stalking a Red column. As they edged forward under Communist machine-gun fire, clouds of smoke and dust rose ahead of them as French artillery pounded the Communist positions. On the other flank, a battalion of turbaned Moroccans attacked Hill 101 chanting, "There is no God but God."

Suddenly the Moroccan Sons of the Prophet were caught in a heavy enfilading fire. Muongs and Moroccans now began to pull back, fighting all the way. At twilight, General de Lattre's pilot warned him they must leave. From the Plexiglas window of his small plane, De Lattre continued to watcn the battle, saw that artillery fire had stopped the Communists.

Spirit of the Enemy. Back in his house on the Boulevard Gambetta in Hanoi that night, Commander in Chief de Lattre said: "The spirit of the man who leads the enemy is the kind of spirit which means it to be a great battle." As for his own spirit, De Lattre pointed to a huge situation map: "I will use my air. I will use my artillery. I will use my infantry. Perhaps after having tasted it for another day, the enemy will say 'enough.' I am sure we will win."

Meanwhile, in Vinhyen, news of De Lattre's visit to the fighting front spread among the troops. The Muongs and Moroccan Mohammedans went back to the attack. While the Muong hill men held the flanks, the Moroccans flung themselves at Hill 101, got to the top. Then four Communist battalions counterattacked. Three times they were driven off that night, but the fourth time they broke into the Moroccans, took the hill.

While the hill was changing hands, a French engineer battalion was clearing a new road over an old disused railroad track into Vinhyen. Under cover of darkness, a battalion of crack French paratroops, drawn from De Lattre's central mobile reserve, moved over the new road at a furious pace, got to the rear of the Communists. Hit from behind the Communists turned savagely on the paratroopers, wiped out one squad. At a critical moment a wounded paratroop leader held his ground and for fifteen minutes continued to fire short accurate bursts from a light machine gun. His action broke up the Red attack. Forced now to pull back from Hill 101, the Communists made a fighting withdrawal with the paratroop battalion in full pursuit. At daylight the Cobras came back to the attack shooting up the retreating Communists wherever they showed signs of making a stand.

Hill 101 was a key sector in last week's five-day battle for Hanoi. It showed how the French defense system was functioning, and the quality of the new French fighting spirit. The French said they had killed 1,500 Communists, probably wounded 6,000, captured 480. Their own total casualties were "not a tenth those of the enemy."

For three days after the battle the French chased the Communists back into the hills without regaining contact with them. Said De Lattre: "We have not yet encountered any Chinese volunteers, but the extraordinary increase of Red strength would not have been possible without foreign aid." He warned of a new Communist offensive, probably before Feb. 6, the Chinese (and Indo-Chinese) New Year.

Whenever it came, there was now a French will to break it.

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