Eyes on Y

The U.S., still without a consistent world policy, still grateful for any chance to wait for the dust to settle, was making the logical worst of its uncertainty. Last week, while it was trying to drum up the courage and decision of its friends, it was also ignominiously truckling to its enemy.

In Europe, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, entrusted with the most important military-diplomatic mission ever given a U.S. soldier, went from capital to capital urging Western Europe to start mobilizing its defenses. Meanwhile, at Lake Success, U.N. Delegate Warren Austin, carrying out a different kind of mission for the Administration, joined other members of U.N. in anxiously waving the olive branch in the direction of the scornful and truculent Chinese Communists (see INTERNATIONAL). It was a gesture that could be interpreted by the world as what it was: appeasement.

Snail's Pace. The long-standing indecision of the Administration showed on other fronts. In his Economic Report, despite promises of vast expenditures in the future, the President gave some idea of the relatively niggling size of the rearmament effort to date. Currently, he pointed out, rearmament is taking 7% of the national output; next year it may take as much as 18%. In World War II, rearmament absorbed 45% of all the nation's wealth and property.

Illinois' Senator Paul Douglas (see below) offered further evidence of the snail's pace of the war effort. "Total expenditures of the Department of Defense," he said, "for the six months up to Jan. 2, 1951, were $7.9 billions as compared to $7.2 billions during the comparable period of the year before. This was an increase of only 9%. Yet the military situation is certainly more than 9% more serious than it was a year ago."

The Calendar. The thinking that led to the obvious anomalies in the nation's international course was done in the State Department. The thinking behind the slow pace of mobilization was a product of the Pentagon.

The Pentagon had a calendar. The minds of top U.S. military men revolved around two hypothetical dates: P: X, when Russia would have enough atomic bombs to cripple the U.S. and thus be ready to attack.

P: Y, when Europe, with U.S. help, would have enough divisions to protect herself, thus making Russia think twice about her plans for world conquest.

It was anyone's guess, but X might well be some time in 1952, Y some time in 1954. X, therefore, was the moment of peril. But by the terms of their own calendar, the military men could not hope to be ready before Y.

With Fingers Crossed. The State Department seemed to see no opportunity for decisive action while the U.S. still had the big advantage of the atomic-bomb stockpile. And the military seemed to see no opportunity for speeded-up rearmament, no matter how willing the U.S. public was to pay the bill.

The Pentagon argued that the country was not ready with the equipment or the housing for a big armed force. Furthermore, the military men had decided that the publicwhich the Pentagon loves to analyzewas not psychologically prepared to support indefinitely a vast, idle army. What would they do with the troops in case Russia did not attack? Besides, a big army would deplete the labor force needed for industrial expansion.

The Pentagon believed that with sufficient cadres of trained men it could expand its armed forces fast enough to meet any crisis. As for industrial mobilization, that was being carried out about as rapidly as possibleor so the Pentagon thought. Industry, it was argued, could expand overnight into an all-out-war program.

In short, the military men, long exposed to the Administration's maybe-something-will-turn-up policy, had taken up the same policy. They had weighed the dangers of rapid mobilization against the chances of being caught unprepared, and had decided that the second alternative would have less serious consequences. This reasoning did not even fit the Pentagon soldiers' own timetable; Russia would be ready, if the timetable was right, a good two years before the soldiers were. The military men crossed their fingers, kept their eyes on Y, and tried not to worry too much about X.

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