Moscow's Little Finger

Last November Moscow made a clear-as-vodka attempt to disrupt the Western decision to rearm Western Germany: the Kremlin held out the enticing prospect of another Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. The U.S., Britain and France replied that such a talk must include not only the question of Germany but of other areas of disagreement as well. On New Year's Eve, the Russians answered. They reaffirmed their offer to talk about Germany, but gave neither a flat da nor a flat niet on whether they were willing to talk about the other sore spots.

The French, who had only reluctantly agreed to German rearmament, chose to find grounds for hope in Moscow's vague reply. There was a lot of talk in Britain and France to the effect that the West ought to stand ready to delay or scrap West Germany's defense in exchange for Russian concessions. The fact remained that no conceivable concessions by Moscow could be worth a strong Germany in the Western camp. Washington remained cool to the Russian offer. But by merely crooking its diplomatic little finger, Moscow had managed to show up (and increase) the cracks in the Western front.

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