"Our First Consideration"

In 2 1/2 hours one afternoon last week, Robert A. Taft, cool, confident and precise as a mathematics teacher, laid before Congress the cause of those who want to systematize and retrench the U.S.'s vacillating world policy. He came before the Senate as a man who had long spoken as "Mr. Republican" on domestic policy, but it was not in that role that he spoke on foreign policy. In foreign affairs no one could speak for more than a segment of either sorely divided party.

Taft began with a ringing denunciation of the Administration's whole conduct of world affairs since Teheran and Yalta. The U.S., said he, has embarked on a fatal path--"policies which may lead to unnecessary war, policies which may wreck the internal economy . . . and vastly weaken our economic abilities . . . policies which may commit us to obligations we are utterly unable to perform . . ."

What to Argue About. Taft took his stand between two pillars of conviction. One was that war between Russia and the U.S. is not inevitable. He saw no "conclusive evidence" that the Russians contemplated starting a war with the U.S.; he did not even believe the Russians were going to attempt a military conquest of Western Europe. The other was that in the event of war, the U.S. could never hope to defeat Russia in a great clash of land armies. On these premises, Senator Taft built his case.

Basically, Taft's case was this: The U.S. must stake its future on sea and air power, not land power, which could be sucked into Europe and Asia and be destroyed. U.S. sea and air power should be made strong and flexible enough to balance all the military might Russia can assemble, flexible enough to exert great control over "the rest of the world and over the enemy country." Said Taft: "If the Russians realize that that power cannot be challenged and can do real damage to their own nation with the atomic bomb and otherwise, their purpose of military aggression may well wither and peaceful relations in Europe may grow again."

Taft agreed that a U.S. land army of "reasonable size" (about 1,500,000 men) would be necessary--to repel any invasion of the American continent, to defend a global string of U.S. and allied sea and air bases, and perhaps to fight occasional minor actions in selected areas where there was a clear opportunity for victory. At some later date, if Europe's defense appeared to have "a reasonable chance of success," he would be willing to send "some limited number of American divisions" to help. Until then, and as a basic principle, the nation's allies must provide their own land defenses.

How to Prepare for War. This was not isolationism, Taft said, nor was that the label for Hoover's doctrine of Gibraltar-ism (TIME, Jan. 1). "It seems to me that our battle against Communism is in fact a worldwide battle and must be fought on the world stage . . . [but] our first consideration must be defense of America." Here is how he would wage the battle:

P: Accept the U.N.'s value as a world forum, but realize that in meeting aggression the U.N. is "an utterly ineffective weapon."

P: Assist with air and sea forces any island nations which desire help--Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the British Isles.

P: Protect Japan ("a special case") by making a quick peace with her and providing air and sea forces and "perhaps a few divisions" until the Japanese have built their own defense forces.

P: Recognize that the U.S. is already at war with Communist China, but avoid open conflict with China. Give Chiang Kai-shek the arms and other help he needs to carry the fight to the Chinese Reds on the mainland.

P: Give economic assistance to nations which "really want assistance," including arms for the North Atlantic pact partners, Indo-China, Greece and Turkey.

P: Consider giving aid to Franco Spain and perhaps provide some land troops, sea and air forces to defend the Malay Peninsula, the Suez Canal and North Africa.

In Western Europe, Taft recognized, lies the "greatest question of policy before the country." As a guiding principle in determining U.S. policy in Europe, he reiterated: "Commit no American troops to the European continent at this time."

Taft, one of the 13 Senators who voted against the North Atlantic Treaty, still thought it "a tremendous mistake," and one compounded by the appointment of General Eisenhower to lead a European army. "[The treaty] will make war more likely," Taft argued. "If they have any intention to attack, they obviously will attack before the Atlantic pact forces are built up, and it will take at least three years to build them up. Why should they wait?" He conceded that the U.S. could not welsh on its treaty pledge to come to the aid of any attacked North Atlantic partner. But he insisted that this implied no obligation to contribute U.S. divisions to the North Atlantic army.

In fact, said Taft, the President had already "usurped authority" by sending U.S. troops into Korea. Said Taft: "The President has no power to agree to send American troops to fight in Europe. Congress by resolution . . . or by restriction in the appropriation bill providing the divisions required may finally determine the policy to be pursued."

How Much to Spend. One of the most persuasive attributes of his policy, as Robert Taft saw it, was its relative economy. An Air Force and a Navy of 700,000 men each and a 1,500,000-man Army (compared with 3,500,000 currently contemplated by the Administration) would, he calculated, cost $40 billion a year. The bill could be paid by taxes. The Administration's military program would cost $20 or $30 billion more a year, turn the U.S. into a garrison state, probably destroy the national economy and thereby give Russia the capitalistic collapse she has always hoped for. "The key to all the problems before this Congress," said Taft, "lies in the size of our military budget."

How to Strike Back. Illinois' Paul Douglas jumped to his feet. Was the Senator from Ohio saying that, in the event of war with Russia, the U.S. would fight back only with retaliatory bombing?

"So far as our part in a war with Russia is concerned," Taft replied, "it would be largely conducted by sea and air."

Douglas: Is it not true that Korea has pretty well demonstrated that you cannot turn back an aggressive land force by air power alone . . . and will not Communist armies sweep therefore through completely to the English Channel?

Taft: Does the Senator think there would be any difference if we have ten American divisions there?

Oregon's Republican Wayne Morse joined the debate. Was the Senator assuming that Russia contemplated a military sweep across Europe?

Said Taft: "I share the point of view that they intend to take it over by Communist infiltration and persuasion . . . I suggest that Russia will stop, that in all probability they would rely on France turning Communist by itself and that they would probably rely on making some sort of trade arrangements with British Socialism, to which Soviet Russia may not object."

"A Very Shocking Thing." Whether Britain and France fell by force of arms or by force of political extortion, Douglas pointed out, their fall would leave the great industrial potential of Western Europe and the raw materials of Asia open to Russia without a struggle. Taft's reply: If the Russians swept over Western Europe, the U.S. would have to destroy Western Europe's industrial facilities with bombs.

Arkansas' William Fulbright broke in: "It is a very shocking thing for Europeans to realize that we are willing to contemplate their destruction."

There were other soft spots in Taft's case. A Russia now deterred by the threat of U.S. atomic bombs might feel less awed as its own stockpile grew. And there was not much in law to support the argument that the President had "usurped authority" to send troops to Korea and to commit them to Europe. History books listed more than 130 cases where U.S. Presidents sent U.S. troops into armed action to defend the national interest.*

But the most obvious flaw in the whole Taft position was his hopeful prophecy that Russia would not attack the U.S. It justified a look at his record as a military prophet. In February 1941 Taft predicted with equal certainty: "It is simply fantastic to suppose there is danger of an attack on the U.S. by Japan."

Only the Beginning. The debate was not going to be settled by quotations from the past or generalities of the moment. The Great Debate was only beginning. At its outset, however, Robert Taft had laid down a major alternative to the present wavering course of U.S. policy, and he had done it with a firmness and a clarity not yet achieved by the Truman Administration.

This week, the men who saw only danger and disgrace in retrenchment--among them Democrat Douglas of Illinois and Republican Styles Bridges of New Hampshire--got ready to answer. If they could state their case as clearly and as well, even those who opposed Taft could thank him for striking the issue.

* Some of them: In 1802 President Jefferson sent a naval expedition to war with the Barbary pirates; in 1900 President McKinley sent U.S. sailors, soldiers and marines into China to help quell the Boxer Rebellion; in 1912 President Taft established an American "protectorate" over Nicaragua with the marines in charge.

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