Poor Showing

With the Hungnam evacuation completed, tacticians looked back on the battle --the U.S. breakout from the Changjin trap, the fighting retreat to the sea, and the successful evacuation--to assess the showing made by the Chinese, who had looked so overwhelming in the first flush of their massive offensive. The assessment was that in northeast Korea, Mao's men had made a very poor showing indeed.

Whether through lack of mobility, of equipment, of tactical judgment, or a combination of these and other factors, they muffed several excellent chances to ruin the X Corps operation. They suffered casualties at least five times as heavy as those of the U.S. forces--perhaps even heavier--but after the defense perimeter around Hungnam had been erected, the Chinese seemed unable to utilize their greatest asset: manpower.

Said Major General O. P. Smith of the ist Marine Division, after the battle: "They knew all about us, all right, where we were and what we had. But I can't understand their tactics. Instead of hitting us with everything in one place, they kept on hitting us at different places . . . The only advantage they have on God's green earth is numbers."

How Not to Stop Marines. The first part of the battle was almost exclusively a marine show, although the marines were accompanied to safety by two 7th Infantry Division battalions (seriously depleted by losses). When the Chinese first struck in the Changjin area, Smith had two regiments at Yudam, west of the reservoir, and a third strung out along the road from Hagaru to the south. The Chinese hit the two regiments at Yudam with no less than three divisions, but wilted under counterattack. They next failed to knock out the headquarters garrison at Hagaru, which would have prevented the division from assembling at that point. Finally, they failed to overrun the garrison at Koto, a move which would have blocked the marines' road to the sea.

The battle from Hagaru to Koto was marked by heavy casualties on both sides. After that, the Chinese tried to stop the marines by blowing a dam and a bridge, and by sporadic shooting from the sides of the road. Not once from Koto to the sea did the marines run into a massively defended roadblock. This, of course, was partly due to effective air help and to the 3rd Division's rescue force, which came up from Hungnam and cleared the lower part of the road. Nevertheless, the U.S. column was a force of 20,000 traveling through territory held by about 70,000 Chinese.

How Not to Destroy a Beachhead. After they reached the sea, the marines were promptly evacuated, and the 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions deployed for the perimeter defense, with two R.O.K. divisions on the right. If the Chinese had had enough foresight (and the necessary artillery), they could have shelled Hungnam to ruins before the defense perimeter was erected and before the warships arrived. If they had attacked with a large and concentrated force at one point on the perimeter, they might have broken through to the port area. But they made no serious effort. On Friday, Dec. 15, 2,500 Chinese attacked the left side of the beachhead held by the 3rd Division, and suffered about 1,000 casualties.

After the Friday attack, according to prearranged plan, the U.S. contracted the defense to a smaller arc, which brought the enemy within range of warships offshore. The wall of fire from land, sea and air around the beachhead apparently discouraged the Chinese; they turned over the attack chores to North Koreans, who never made the slightest dent in the defense ring. The evacuation went on, unhurried and unruffled. In addition to more than 200,000 allied soldiers and civilians, the ships took off 17,500 vehicles and 350,000 tons of supplies, including some self-propelled 76-mm. Russian-made guns previously captured from the North Koreans. The G.I.s left almost nothing in wrecked Hungnam except a sardonic sign: "WE DON'T WANT THE DAMN PLACE ANYWAY."

The failure of the Chinese against the X Corps in northeast Korea was a good augury--among some gloomy ones--for future fighting on the peninsula.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.