Monday, Dec. 11, 1950
After the Breakthrough
"Last night about eleven o'clock," said a U.S. major, "My George [G] Company was hit from three sides, the left, right and front, by about three companies of Chinese. One of my patrols picked the first ones up about 150 yards out. The Chinese charged in and overwhelmed us with a real mass attack. About three out of every ten of them were loaded with automatic weapons of some sort--Tommy guns, burp guns or automatic carbines. Others carried .25-caliber Jap rifles. They were all loaded down with grenades."
The major and his battalion pulled back to the Chongchon River, but found the crossing point covered by Communists firing 3-5-in. bazookas (apparently captured American weapons) with great accuracy. G.I.s trying to cross on flak wagons and other vehicles were mowed down. Many wounded had to be left behind.
This small, terrible episode was like many others, all week long, all along the "fluid" Korean front. But all the episodes added up still could not tell the whole story of the Allied disaster, which was more than a loss of men, material and territory (see above). No one publicly guessed at U.S. casualty figures but one officer said they would be "shockers" when revealed.
Gum in the Fire Hose. Early last week there was still hope--among Tokyo optimists, at least -- that Douglas MacArthur's abortive "end-the-war" offensive had only "temporarily" been halted, that a major enemy breakthrough could be prevented. The ist Cavalry Division, aided by British and Turks, was rushed to plug the enormous gap in the Tokchon sector where the R.O.K. II Corps had been shattered. It was like trying to plug a fire hose with a wad of chewing gum. The cavalrymen were beaten back 30 miles to Sinchang, then lost the town and fell back still farther.
This week there was no sign of where or how the enemy onrush could be stopped.
As Chinese hordes poured around the Eighth Army's open right flank, the 24th, 2nd and 25th Divisions fell back to the Chongchon and began crossing at Sinanju (see map), where a valuable airfield was lost, Anju and Kunu farther upriver. It was obvious that General Walker would have to keep his whole Eighth Army moving south if it was not to be trapped or rolled up from the flank.
The Kunu crossing, farthest inland and closest to the breakthrough zone, was the toughest. A 2nd Division regiment, commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman of Roanoke, Va., fought a rearguard action at Kunu to save as much as possible of an eight-mile vehicle train. Said the colonel: "We will go down the road on trucks, if we can. Otherwise we will destroy the trucks and go over the mountains, shooting backward every step of the way. We've gone through miracle after miracle, and we need one more."
The bulk of the 2nd got across at Kunu, as did the bulk of the other divisions at the other crossings, and the bridges were blown. Tokyo called the Chongchon withdrawal a "masterpiece."
Iron Ring. The Communist drive down the center of Korea's waist broke all contact between the Eighth Army and General Almond's X Corps, sprawled out over northeastern Korea. At the Changjin reservoir, Major General Oliver Prince Smith's 1st Marine Division had made a vain try to cut in behind the Chinese attacking the Eighth. Now Smith's men found themselves attacked by ten Communist divisions, which threw an iron ring around the reservoir, around the marines, and around most of the 7th Infantry Division. The fighting men in this trap were supplied by airdrop, at first from lumbering C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command, then by C-47s which landed --despite Chinese antiaircraft hidden in the neighboring hills--on a bumpy, makeshift field and took out wounded.
The three marine regiments, which had been in separated positions around the reservoir, finally fought their way through to junction in Hagaru, to the south, after running into bloody ambushes along the roads. The Communists fired on them comfortably at steep grades and hairpin turns, where the marines' vehicles slowed to a crawl. A dreadful indication of the casualties in this sector was that 1,200 wounded were flown out in the first two days.
Dire Peril. Advance elements of the Army's 7th Division, which two weeks ago had stood gloriously on the Yalu River, were hastily called back to the south, but it was doubtful whether they would make it. Other elements of the 7th began fighting southwest from Hagaru, to open a road to the sea--and possible evacuation--at Hamhung-Hungnam, toward which the marines too were headed.
But the Communists were forging a larger trap. They also were driving in force for Hamhung, and for Wonsan 50 miles to the south. There was nothing in front of them except the X Corps' 3rd Division, part of which opposed the Communist advance at Huksu. The 3rd Division was not enough to put up a defense on a wide front. If, as seemed likely and imminent, the Communists reached a long stretch on the Sea of Japan, the entire X Corps would be in dire peril of destruction.
Evacuation. Meanwhile, the U.N. command gave up all hope of maintaining a sea-to-sea line above Pyongyang. A tentative 40-mile defense arc around the North Korean capital had been established, but with the right flank still dangling and Mao's men still swarming around it, there was no means of holding it. The Chinese were bringing up tanks and artillery (lacking in the first days of the offensive); they were driving Koreans out of their homes to the roads, to impede Allied movements and screen their own advance. The Allies began to evacuate Pyongyang (see below), ably screened on the north by the British 29th Brigade. This week all Eighth Army divisions completed their withdrawal from the city.
This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.