"DOES HE WANT US TO LIVE?"

Dean Acheson last week invited U.N. to settle the "Question of Formosa" and its "longterm political" status (see above). What effect did this action have on Formosa? John Osborne, senior TIME & LIFE correspondent in the Pacific, was in Taipei when news of Acheson's step reached the Nationalist capital. His 'report:

IN looking for the "Question of Formosa," the visitor has the help of many more Americans than were here last July, when the U.S. posture on this island was at its tragic low. Then the senior U.S. officials in residence were a charge d'affaires and Colonel David Barrett, a famous "old China hand" who headed a staff of six military attaches including himself. Since then an American Minister, Karl Rankin, has taken over, a ruddy and genial man of stature and intelligence. In the seven weeks since he arrived, he has galvanized the listless diplomatic staff and earned the respect of Nationalist officialdom. Rear Admiral Harry Jarrett heads an enlarged staff of attaches.

Brigadier General John Conklin, from Tokyo, directs a Survey Group which General MacArthur has sent to Formosa to study the military needs of the Nationalists. Major General Howard Turner, commander of Clark Field in the Philippines, flies in & out, and every few days U.S. jet fighters from Clark and Okinawa fly over the island.

Warships of the Seventh Fleet, assigned to Formosa patrol, regularly tie up at the island's ports. Even the U.S.

Information Service has come to life, enthusiastically launching a new effort to communicate with the common folk of Formosa in their own idiom.

Anyone reading these and other signs might think that the U.S. Government had suddenly come to regard the Nationalist government as a friend and ally. But the fact is that no meaningful change in the U.S. Government's attitude toward the recognized government of Nationalist China has been made apparent in Taipei. I can also report that no one in Taipei is aware of any substantial "Question of Formosa," except the problem created and sustained by our Government's apparent determination to eliminate the Chinese Nationalists from Asia.

The Blow. By all I could learn in Taipei this week, the Nationalist government continues to improve in performance, to an extent and in ways which no one would have thought possible a year or so ago. By the same testimony, the Nationalist armed forces of some 700,000 men preserves a remarkably high state of morale, considering the debilitating effects of our new policy of "neutralization." Nationalist leaders see in Secretary Acheson's latest move a blow which, if it is allowed to fall, will destroy the Nationalists and eliminate their armed forces as a factor against Communism in Asia.

Mr. Acheson's decision to raise "the future status of Formosa" for U.N. discussion and decision obviously challenges the Nationalists' present right to be on Formosa and to oppose the mainland Communists from Formosa. If their very right to be here is questioned, then what chance of survival have they? What of the native Formosans whose support the mainland refugees have tried hard to win? What of the millions still on the mainland whose support must be won and held if the Communists are ever to be faced and fought on the mainland? What of the many thousands of Nationalist guerrillas who harass the Communists with more or less effect, and incidentally supply vital military intelligence which the U.S. can get from no one else? What of the Nationalist forces on Formosa itself, if word gets around that this government's right to be on this island and even to exist is being questioned by the great U.S.?

The Answers. The Generalissimo and his highest advisers have arrived at the only answers possible for them. Prime Minister Chen Cheng, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, the Gimo's secretary general, and Foreign Minister George Yeh told me this week that the Nationalist government will: 1) Oppose to the last ditch any discussion of "the future status of Formosa" by the U.N.; 2) At whatever cost in world misunderstanding reject any decision or action by the U.N. which brings into question the Nationalists' right to be on this island and to resist the Communists of Asia from this island.

Nevertheless, the same officials have resolved to accept and cooperate with any temporary truce which the U.S. or the U.N. may want to impose. All they ask is that the truce not be made permanent; they fail to see why they should be forever forbidden to fight back at the Communists.

A member of the Nationalist cabinet, musing over the matter the other night, summed up Nationalist feelings very neatly: "If I could see Mr. Acheson tomorrow morning, I would ask him just two questions. Does he want us to live, or does he want us to die? Does he want us to grow strong on this island, or does he want to throw us off this island?"

Mr. Acheson's answer is awaited with interest in Taipei.

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