War Now? Or When? Or Never?

When a man knows he has a good chance to be A-bombed, nothing can stop him from wondering whether there isn't something he can do to prevent it. That is why talk of "preventive war" by the U.S. against the U.S.S.R. stays on the tongues of the American people, even after President Truman has effectively, and prudently, muffled official discussion of this and kindred subjects.

The statement of Secretary of the Navy Matthews that the U.S. should consider "instituting ... a war of aggression for peace" clings to the consciousness even of those who reject the idea with horror.

Even harder to forget is the proposal for which the Air Force's Major General Orvil A. Anderson was suspended: "Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia's five A-bomb nests in a week."

Such statements are bound to get attention from Americans who (correctly) consider themselves possible victims of Russian A-bombs. Very few Americans now believe that the Kremlin can be conciliated or appeased or reasoned with. Very few are content to sit back and wait for the Communists to strike. They want to know what can be done. This is a summary of the pros & cons of the main paths open to U.S. policy.

"PREVENTIVE WAR" IN 1950

Pro. U.S. effective superiority over Russia in atomic weapons will never be greater than at present; as the months and years pass, it will almost certainly be less. This is true in spite of the fact that the U.S., in any given month, will probably continue to produce more atomic bombs than the U.S.S.R. As TIME said in August 1945, just after the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima: "That the U.S. could always produce more bombs than any other country was meaningless when 500 bombs would have as decisive an effect as 50,000." Most military men are now convinced that the Russians may soon have a couple of hundred bombs. With such a supply they could destroy the centers of U.S. technical and industrial power, and thus take away, "for the duration," the one great and overriding U.S. asset. The preventive war argument runs: Why sit and wait for that?

Con. This argument would be hard to answer in purely military terms if the U.S., by striking first, could (as General Anderson seemed to suggest) really destroy Russia's atomic capabilities. But by "atomic nests" Anderson obviously meant Russian A-bomb factories. He could hardly hope to destroy the stockpile of Russian bombs already made and hidden. Nobody knows how large this stockpile is; probably it is more than 10 and less than 60--enough to give the Kremlin a means of dreadful retaliation.

While atomic blows were exchanged, the Red army would engulf Europe. There is nothing yet in Europe that could dam the Red flood. U.S. atomic damage to Russia would be strategically effective only if the Red army were forced by large-scale fighting to expend its hoarded oil, ammunition and other materials. Preventive war in 1950 would mean that the Russians 1) could wreak terrible damage on the U.S., and 2) could take and hold Western Europe, which would be worth more to them than all the targets in Russia that the U.S. could destroy by atomic bombing.

The Communist leaders, if Russia suffered real destruction, could abandon their own industrial cities and set up their new power centers in the great capitals and industrial complexes of Western Europe. Confronted with such a vast fact, the U.S. would be faced with these alternatives: 1) to try to bomb the Russians out of Europe, which would mean utter destruction of the ancient seats of Western civilization; 2) to mount an invasion of Europe, in the teeth of the Red army forces and their atomic bombs; 3) to let the Communists keep their hold on Western Europe--and pray.

Conclusion. Militarily, preventive war by the U.S. in 1950 would be a blunder of tragic proportions. The U.S. would lose more than it could hope to gain. In such a situation the question of the morality of preventive war, which troubles many Americans, may not even arise. Whether or not preventive war is morally bad, the facts of 1950 make it military nonsense.

WAR IN 1953?

Pro. Western Europe, defenseless now, can be made defensible if the U.S. and its Allies immediately start an urgent program of mobilization and armament. A world crisis in 1953 could confront the Russians with the possibility of atomic attack by the U.S. and at the same time deny them their present opportunity to take Western Europe. If they had to fight hard for Western Europe, their pipeline to the front would need filling from factories--which could be destroyed by bombing. Under such circumstances the U.S. atomic superiority would have more chance that it now has of being strategically decisive.

Con. But the Russians in 1953 will have increased their atomic stockpile, thus materially reducing the present U.S. advantage in atomic weapons.

Conclusion. The U.S. advantage in preponderance of bombs is less important than the strategic framework within which the bombs might be used. In spite of its lessening atomic lead, the U.S. would have a better chance of winning a war in 1953 than in 1950, provided Western Europe were vigorously defended by 60 good European and U.S. divisions. Under these circumstances the free world could reasonably hope that the Kremlin would suspend its present aggressive drive. Only under such circumstances would talk of the "peaceful coexistence" of the free world and the U.S.S.R. begin to make sense.

WAR LATER

Pro. Neither Europe nor the U.S. wants to move fast enough to make Europe defensible by 1953. A later date would be more "realistic."

Con. Nothing could be more realistic than the fact that the longer Europe stays defenseless (while the U.S.S.R. makes A-bombs), the more the danger of war increases--and the greater grows the threat that the West would lose the war.

Conclusion. Postponing preparations for a possible showdown beyond a 1953 deadline is a disguised policy of drift; it is just waiting for the atomic dust to settle on Chicago.

All these possibilities are dangerous, but the second--intensive preparation for a showdown by 1953--seems the least perilous of the three. This path has, however, a special pitfall which could make it the most dangerous of all. If the U.S. and its Allies do not start intensive defense preparations immediately, or if they adopt half-measures, or if they are lulled by Russian conciliatory gestures into stopping halfway, then they will place themselves in a worse position than their present one.

Intensive preparation for a showdown in 1953 requires, besides the arming of Europe, two other efforts:

1) Holding the line against Communism in Asia, and pressing it back wherever opportunity offers or can be created.

2) Looking to the atomic defense of the continental U.S. This country can never be made safe from atomic attack: no major bombardment against land targets--especially a multiplicity of targets--has ever been completely stopped. However, the effectiveness of an enemy atomic attack can be somewhat reduced. Yet on such matters as radar warning screens and civilian defense and fighter defenses to cope with an atomic raid, the U.S. and Canada have done almost nothing.

There are still some Americans who believe that any preparations for defense will provoke Russia. They may be right. Nobody can predict with certainty how the Kremlin will react. Men, however, rarely have a chance to act on certainties. They deal in probabilities. The probability is that the Russians will be more likely to attack if the U.S. and its Allies remain in or near their present indefensible condition.

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