Focus of Hope

In Korea this week, with the U.S. defense position breached and envelopment threatened from the flanks, the prospect that had been clearly visible last fortnight became even more imminent: a further series of withdrawals from the Kum River to a relatively short perimeter around the port of Pusan.

Even if the thin line of U.S. youngsters on the south bank of the Kum had miraculously prevented a single Communist from crossing, they would have had to pull out of the salient around Taejon anyway. The Communist drive on their right flank (see below) threatened to cut the rail line, perhaps encircle and destroy the forces on the U.S.'s first line of defense. After delaying the enemy as much as they could, their main business was to get out alive and intact.

Obviously and wisely, General MacArthur was not pouring troops into the Korean battle as fast as he could.. There were two good reasons why he refrained from a headlong effort to reinforce his hard-pressed men: 1) even at the maximum rate of build-up which U.S. forces in the Far East might now attain, they had little or no present chance of launching a drive northward against the Communists; 2) with the Communists still menacing other points in the Far East (e.g., Formosa, Indo-China), it would be the height of recklessness to be sucked out of position by committing all the U.S. strength in the area to the Korean battle. On the other hand, MacArthur did not intend to be pushed off the Korean peninsula and to be left with the appalling prospect of having later to mount an amphibious attack on Korea from Japan.

His strategy had to be shaped between the determination not to be sucked out of position and the determination to keep a foothold in Korea. These two factors dictated a three-phase war.

First Phase: fight a delaying action toward Pusan, an excellent port only 150 miles from Japan, across waters controlled by the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Establish a perimeter around Pusan with both flanks resting on the sea (see map). The ideal beachhead would be small enough to be held by three or four well-armed U.S. divisions plus regrouped South Korean troops (see below), yet large enough to protect Allied activities in & around the port from enemy artillery fire. Barring Russia's intervention, the U.S and U.N. forces would have control of the air and sea, and ought to be able to hold such a protected beachhead indefinitely.

Second Phase: build up U.S. strength inside the perimeter without stripping MacArthur's Japanese base of all its troops and supplies.

Third Phase: when ready (probably months hence), break out of the Pusan perimeter, as Patton had broken out of the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy. This main offensive north from Pusan could be supported by Allied amphibious attacks behind the North Korean lines on either coast.

Only when this stage was reached could the Allies expect the beginnings of a victory over the North Koreans.

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