Monday, Mar. 06, 1950
Before & After
The election was a very sharp setback for the Labor Party, a powerful comeback for the Conservatives. In 1945 Labor had won 61% of the House of Commons; last week it won only a shade more than 50%. With 313 seats needed for an absolute majority, Labor had 315, the Conservatives 296, the Liberals 9, independents 3. The Speaker is considered a neutral, and one district will elect later.
Retrospect. When the returns had finally been tabulated, these points were worth noting:
P: The Labor losses were probably part of the same swing which had brought about socialist defeats in Australia, New Zealand and on the continent of Europe. P: Both the British Laborites and Tories soft-pedaled the issue of government-owned industry. Nevertheless, in Britain, there was and still is a vague disappointment with the results of nationalization and it is highly probable that this was a hidden, but important, factor in Labor's loss of steam. P:| Both parties promised to continue a state welfare program, which is undeniably popular with the mass of Britons. But the Labor Party is much more intimately identified with the welfare state than the Tories; the vote may indicate that large sections of the British public have begun to question the high price of the welfare state.
P: The election was held during a period of unprecedented full employment and rising real wages (both partly sustained by U.S. aid). These conditions would be expected to help the party in power. That Labor suffered an undeniable setback in these circumstances indicates grave British doubts about the long-range -aspects of the Labor program. P: Labor almost held its own in the big cities. The Tories have made no appreciable headway among industrial workers. The increased Tory vote in rural and semi-rural areas resulted from better Tory vote-getting organization. With near-success, this improved organization can be expected to continue.
P: Left-wing Laborites like ardent, outspoken Aneurin Bevan (see above) complained that Labor would have done better if it had fought a more militant, more frankly leftish campaign. There is no objective reason to believe this. Both major parties drove for the middle, squeezing the Liberals between them. In the doubting mood of the British electorate, these cautious tactics were probably sound for both sides.
Prospect. As to the future, the following points can be made:P: The Laborite majority is too small for effective government. The danger to the Labor government is not so much from desertion, because party discipline in Britain is much stronger than in the U.S. The graver danger is absenteeism, which is both customary and inevitable in the House of Commons. Some members of Parliament are also ministers. Their administrative duties often take them away from London. Illness can strike one side more than the other at a given time. Many M.P.s have other jobs, requiring their absence from the House. These factors leave any government with a majority of less than 20 at the mercy of the Opposition, which can call for a "snap division" and defeat the government on a serious issue, thus bringing about a new election. P:But the Tories probably do not want a new election right away. Last week's turnout (84%) was so heavy that neither side has any hope of doing better next time with the stay-at-home vote. The 2.6 million Liberal votes are the only ones in sight which could now give either Labor or Conservatives a clear working majority. The British Institute of Public Opinion-before the election asked Liberals how they would vote if no Liberal candidates were in the field. Half said that they would not vote at all. Of the other half, a third said they would vote Labor and two-thirds Tory. If this is correct, the Tories would pick up from the Liberals a net of some 400,000 votes, enough to give them only the same kind of precarious majority Labor now has.
P: The Tories say frankly (but privately) that they would rather be out by a hair than in by a hair. They (and many Labor leaders) expect an economic crisis in Britain this year. Tory strategy is to let Labor "carry the baby" until the crisis deepens, then bid for a big majority in another election. This might come between April and December 1950.
P: Until that time, Labor can probably continue in office by avoiding controversial subjects, such as further action on nationalization.
P: In foreign affairs there is no reason to expect Britain's voice to be weakened by the hairbreadth situation in the House of Commons. Bipartisan foreign policy is an old story in Britain. With both parties driving towards the center in domestic politics, a working foreign policy should be easily possible. Doctrinaire national socialism has contributed to British obstruction of European integration. This obstruction should be reduced in future months.
*Britain's Gallup poll, which predicted the sensational Labor victory of 1945, came off even better this time. On election eve the poll predicted, in percentages of popular vote, as follows: Labor, 45%; Tories, 43.5%; Liberals, 10.5%; and others (Communists, independents, etc.),1%. Next day, 28 million Britons gave Labor 46.1%; the Tories 43-3%, the Liberals 9.2%, others 1.3%. The chief of Britain's Gallup poll, Henry Durant, is worried about one point: both this time and in 1945, his poll has been light on the Labor votes. "The weakness of polls," says Durant, "is their inability to find poor people . . . The simple, brutal fact is that most interviewers don't like talking to people who smell."
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