A PROGRAM FOR ASIA

U.S. policymakers were known to be worrying, somewhat belatedly, over the Communist advance in Asia; but even after weeks of behind-the-scenes study and discussion no new program had emerged. The immediate question was whether to extend diplomatic recognition to the Communist-dominated government now being formed in China. Washington tended to discuss this in terms of procedural technicalities. Actually, the arguments pro & con would be meaningless until a broad political policy was decided upon.

Refusal to recognize a Chinese Communist government, for instance, would be an inane gesture if the general Asiatic policy was to be one of drifting with the Communist tide. On the other hand, recognition would be hypocritical if the general policy was to begin active resistance to communism in Asia.

The U.S. can continue its present passive attitude toward Asiatic communism. This is a well-worn track and needs no further exploration. It means a little money here, and a diplomatic note of protest there. It is easy, cheap --and useless. Judging by past experience, this policy would end with Communist domination of Asia.

On the other hand, a policy of active resistance to communism in Asia is hard to envisage because it is so remote from U.S. political experience. It would be much more difficult than U.S. anti-Communist strategy for Europe as worked out in the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic pact.

To Stem a Tide. A policy of active resistance in Asia might include:

THE USE OF U.S. SEA-AIR POWER against communism, under all circumstances, to hold key coastal and offshore positions--Japan, Korea, Formosa, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore. Militarily, this program is within present U.S. capabilities. It would not save Asia, but it would save the Pacific, at least temporarily.

COORDINATION, UNDER U.S. LEADERSHIP, of British, Dutch, French and Portuguese policy in Asia. Out of desperation, the French and the Dutch, in the past few years, have taken some unwise steps; these could have been avoided if the inevitable retreat from imperialism had been organized jointly with strength and confidence.

CREATION OF A REGIONAL GROUPING of independent, non-Communist Asiatic nations to work in cooperation with the U.S. and the Western nations for the economic and political progress of all non-Communist Asiatic areas, free and colonial. This would involve development programs sponsored by the U.S. and other nations, using public and private capital. The key to this program is the example of recent British-Indian relations. When India surprisingly decided two months ago to stay in the Commonwealth with Britain, the Communist press howled with disappointment and rage. Well it might. India's decision does not balance the loss of China, but it does point the way to a constructive relationship between the Western and the Asian democracies. Some immediate tasks of an anti-Communist democratic grouping would be: retrieving Burma from its present chaos; helping the Indonesians make a go of independence; stopping the economic and political "slide" in the Philippines.

HELP FROM THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES in all areas under military attack by Communist-led forces. This would include vast regions of West and South China, Burma and Indo-China. Goal: the liberation of Asiatic areas now held by Communists.

A PLEDGE BY THE WESTERN POWERS that all Asiatic peoples will be free and self-governing as soon as possible.

RECOGNITION BY THE ASIATIC NATIONS that the right to national independence does not include the right to place themselves under the Communist imperialist dictatorship. No moral contradiction is involved here; the individual's right to his own life does not include the right to suicide. The Chinese Nationalist government, for instance, has been committing suicide. Its absurd raids on Shanghai by a poltroonish airforce can only have the effect of making more & more Chinese turn toward the Communists.

With Both Feet. Such a program would be a large order indeed. Perhaps it would be beyond the vision and determination of American leadership, as the steps necessary to stop Japan before Pearl Harbor were beyond it.

Half of such a program, however, would be worse than none at all. There is no use trying to hold Indo-China, Burma and Siam out of Communist hands if the U.S. is going to build up the Communist regime in neighboring China by trade and recognition. There is no use squandering money on aid to the kind of anti-Communists who cannot make the aid effective.

If the U.S. goes into Asia, it has to go in with both feet, with money and authority, with the will to help Asians build their own strong, free societies and with the responsibility of preventing them from committing national suicide under the strains of that painful process.

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