Rendezvous in Paris

This week, the Big Four Foreign Ministers walked into the red marble "grand salon" of the Palais Rose, on Paris' majestic Avenue Foch. Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky came in side by side with Britain's Ernie Bevin. Vishinsky laid his papers down on the huge green conference table, then quickly walked up to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, shook his hand. "I am glad to see you again," said Vishinsky. It was noted that the Russian grinned amiably.

The world had seen Russians smile before. Was there greater cause for hope this time? It was certainly wrong to assume, as some observers in the West did, that talking to the Russians was useless. It was also wrong to think that, by talking to the Russians, a permanent settlement between the democracies and communism could be achieved. But between these two extremes there was plenty of room for a settlement of specific issues. For this the world could, and did, have hopes.

First Encounter. That the Russians wanted such a settlement was becoming increasingly clear. The Russians needed a period in which to work out a new, longer-range strategy for Western Europe, consolidate their far-from-secure position in Eastern Europe, and press their offensive in Asia, where communism faces gigantic opportunities whose exploitation, however, requires time and care.

In Paris, where Dean Acheson had been meeting over the weekend with France's Robert Schuman and Britain's Ernie Bevin, the West announced complete solidarity. Acheson, who is in his first major encounter with the Russians, will presumably carry the ball for the West.

His position on the eve of the conference was approximately as follows: i) the Russians must give a clear guarantee of the West's rights in Germany; 2) the Russians must accept West Germany's democratic constitution as the basis for any all-German regime; 3) any political setup for Russia's Eastern Germany must be the result of free, Four-Power supervised elections; 4) the U.S. will not now agree to the withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany (although talk persisted that the U.S. might consider moving its troops to port cities and the French frontier).

Three Times as Much. The conference's opening session got under way. With remarkable speed, the Ministers agreed on a four-point conference agenda proposed by the West: 1) problems of German unity, including "economic and political principles" and Four-Power control; 2) Berlin, including the currency question; 3) preparation of a peace treaty for Germany; 4) consultation on a peace treaty for Austria (the Foreign Ministers' deputies have vainly tried to draft an Austrian treaty for the past 2 1/2 years). Vishinsky also suggested that a peace treaty for Japan be taken up, but Acheson countered that the U.S. wished "no hasty consideration" of the question. When Bevin asked whether agreement on Germany would be a precondition for discussing Austria, Vishinsky replied that it was not, and added: "But we are going to agree on everything here."

"That," said Ernest Bevin, "depends on you."

Referring to the three Western powers' obvious solidarity, Vishinsky cracked back: "It depends three times as much on you as it does on me."

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