"Gentlemen, I Have a Plan"

Into the Kremlin again went the three men from the West--Walter Bedell Smith of the U.S., Frank Roberts of Britain and Yves Chataigneau of France. They had agreed beforehand on a new proposal for "settling" the Berlin crisis. Smith had their plan in his briefcase. Stalin greeted them genially. Before Smith had a chance to open his case, Stalin said: "Gentlemen, I have a plan. Here it is. I believe you will find it acceptable to your governments." Stalin's plan was almost identical with the one Smith carried. The Russians and the West had reached an agreement "in principle."

P: Its gist: the Western powers agreed to abandon the use in Berlin of their Western German money. Russian Zone money under four-power control would be used in Berlin.

P: For this and other purposes the four-power Kommandatura administering Berlin would have another try.

P: The Kommandatura would try to reach agreements on transportation rules and such matters; if successful, this agreement would result in the Russians lifting the blockade of Berlin.

P: When the blockade was lifted, the way would be clear for a four-power Foreign Ministers' Conference on a peace treaty for Germany.

Barbed Fishhooks. Smith's first impulse was to tell Stalin he had a deal. Thirty months in Moscow, however, has taught Smith caution. He told Stalin that he and his colleagues would cable the proposal to their governments. In Washington, experts sat up all night prodding at the Russian text in search of diplomatic booby traps, found none they considered lethal. They cabled Smith a series of suggested clarifications. He and the others tried to work them out with Foreign Minister Molotov. For a week they wrangled over shades of meaning. A Washington official described the process: "Molotov insists on leaving a few fishhooks in the agreement. We're trying to file the barbs off them." At week's end, they were still trying.

In a way, the Kremlin "agreement in principle" was a considerable diplomatic achievement. Although the path it laid down was littered with ifs and buts, still it could lead to an end of the Berlin crisis and even to a four-power conference.

And where was that? That was where the last Foreign Ministers' Conference broke up eight months ago in London, angry and in almost complete disagreement between Russia and the West. To return to that ill-fated council table might be a proper and necessary step, but it would not be an occasion for ringing bells to herald peace or springing the doves for joyous flutterings.

Two Views of the Future. A highly placed French official gave this view of the prospect: "With both parties figuring that time is on their side, I expect protracted negotiations, continuing for many weeks.

"The Russians are having real trouble with their satellites, who are pressing for a resumption of East-West trade. The Russians need time and a relaxation of tension to ease the satellite situation. Some Russians are calculating that Western Union will break down, that the U.S. may run into domestic economic trouble, and even that Henry Wallace may score an unexpected success.

"On the other hand, we think time is working for us, because in a year or two we can hope to have made progress toward a stable Western Europe and toward a U.S.-Western European rearmament."

The Real Issue. Behind the Kremlin talks of the past month and the sparring in prospect over the coming weeks lay the real issue: the long-range Russian effort to win control of Europe.

Germany, Europe's most important state, was the key point in this struggle. The U.S., Britain and France started with an advantage because they controlled Western Germany, which is far more important than the Russian Zone and Berlin.

However, if the West did not revive Western Germany's production and use it for the recovery of Europe, then their advantage would become a liability.

If they did overcome Russian obstructionism and revive Western Germany, then the Communists could go to the Germans with the grave charge that the West was guilty of splitting Germany.

In the Berlin airlift the West had found its best answer to this Russian charge. The Russians were obviously trying to drive the West out, and the West, at great expense, resisted the final division of Germany. This Germans understood, and that understanding hurt the German Communist Party down to its roots (see below).

The West had gained during the eight-month interval since the last Foreign Ministers' session. That fact was infinitely more important than Molotov's verbal fishhooks--which, in their nasty way, were important, too.

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