The End of Partition

This week at Lake Success, U.S. delegate Warren Austin finally dropped the other shoe.*

In a 3,000-word speech, as turbid as the fine print in a lease, Delegate Austin announced that the U.S. had changed its mind on Palestine. The U.S. no longer supported partition. Instead, Austin declared, "My government believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established . . .to maintain the peace [until] Jews and Arabs . . . reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country."

Many Zionists who heard him were near tears. Arab delegates smiled discreetly. The reaction abroad (see INTERNATIONAL) and elsewhere was more violent. U.S. Jewish leaders spoke angrily of a sellout. The New York Herald Tribune spoke for others: "There are few Americans who will be able to regard the action of their government without a sinking of the heart."

Who's to Blame? Thus ended one of the sorrier chapters in U.S. foreign policy. The reasons for the change in policy were plain enough. The struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western powers had made any true collective action on Palestine impossible. The U.N. Palestine Commission (chief of its secretariat: U.S.'s Ralph Bunche) might as well fold up. The U.S. would not, and could not, undertake the responsibility for bringing Soviet troops into the Middle East. It could take action against the Arabs to enforce partition at the risk of losing not only vital Middle East oilfields, but also the friendship of a large part of the Moslem world. On these points, U.S. security was at stake. Secretary of State George Marshall tried to take full responsibility for the final decision. In Los Angeles he said: "I recommended it to the President. . . ."

It was not George Marshall's or the Administration's responsibility exclusively. The whole U.S. shared in it. Originally the Administration's policy had been somewhat cynical and politically opportunistic. But Washington could always argue that it had reflected the sentiments of most of the people. The Administration had yielded to Zionist pressure. But Senator Robert A. Taft and Governor Thomas Dewey had also demanded partition.

In putting all the emphasis on partition, the U.S. had evaded certain other moral responsibilities, particularly to refugees in Europe. Congressmen had consistently refused to consider the Stratton bill, which would have admitted 400,000 D.P.s to the U.S. For refugee Jews, Zion had been their only hope. To the Arabs it looked as if the U.S. preferred to see the Jews of Europe dumped into Palestine. The New York Times summed up: "A series of moves which has seldom been matched for ineptness. . . ."

Hard Questions. What the Administration owed the people was an explanation of why it had pressed so hard four months ago for a policy which was now unworkable; why it had waited so long to take a step it now insisted was necessary to the nation's security.

The solution now proposed left some other questions unanswered. The trusteeship plan seemed to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East. The plan could be passed by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly; a Russion veto could not kill it. The troops to police Palestine could be supplied by the Trusteeship Council. But where would the troops come from?

If some of them were to be Americans, the new move might take the U.S. off one hook and hang it on another. The Jews in Palestine said they were resolved to set up a republic, defend it to the end. Was the Administration now prepared to send U.S. troops to Palestine to get shot at by Jews, perhaps to shoot at them?

*The first one had fallen when the U.S. called upon the Security Council to keep the peace rather than enforce partition (TIME, March 8). Zionists suspected then that the U.S. was getting ready to change its policy.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.