Help from Abroad

The news from London was just what U.S. supporters of the European Recovery Program had been waiting for. Foreign Secretary Ernie Bevin's firm pledge to seek a union of Western European states (see INTERNATIONAL) fitted snugly into the Marshall Plan. The grave and dramatic announcement could hardly have been better timed.

The British plan was right in line with suggestions made only two days before by Republican John Foster Dulles. Appearing before the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles had left no doubt of his belief in the underlying principles of ERP. "Our nation," said he, "cannot long survive as a mere citadel of self-indulging privilege, surrounded by massed human misery." But he proposed as a parallel to continuing U.S. aid "some sort of a customs and monetary union . . . [and] sufficient political unity so that these states will present a solid front to any aggressor."

Though it was improbable that Britain could soon lead the way to the complete union that Dulles proposed, Bevin's announcement was a long first step in the right direction. It was bound to influence those who felt, like Dulles, that it was high time for Europe to make a start toward economic unity, at least. It was also the best possible answer to the harshest attack yet made on ERP.

Rallying Point. The attacker was ex-President Herbert Hoover. Unlike Dulles, he loaded a qualified endorsement of ERP with objections that would destroy the plan piecemeal.

He questioned the size of the appropriation. In the first 15 months, said Hoover, U.S. grants for food and other goods "essential to maintain life" should not exceed $3 billion, should include relief for China, Korea and Japan as well as Europe. Steel and capital goods should be shipped only on a straight loan basis. No money should be given for purchases in other nations; Latin American nations, for instance, should grant their own credits to Europe.

Then Hoover struck right at the heart of the plan. He would limit ERP strictly to a 15-months proposition. Said he: "Even a moral commitment to a four-year program is unwise."

It was obvious that Elder Statesman Hoover had missed the whole point and spirit of ERP, had sadly confused long-term recovery with short-term relief. But his words had provided a new rallying point for congressional recalcitrants. The best way to cut the ground from under them again was just such a proposition as Bevin had made: a long-range goal of cooperative selfhelp, which depended on assurance of long-range U.S. support.

Back Down. By this week ERP's supporters could point to two other forward steps. Treasury Secretary John Snyder agreed to a new census of foreign bank deposits in the U.S. The names of depositors would be turned over to their own governments, who could use the funds for purchases in the U.S. Estimated take: $300 to $400 million.

The other step was taken by the Administration, which was privately prepared to back down on its insistence that ERP be run by the State Department, and would now accept Republican proposals for a separate agency responsible to the President.

Both of these steps would go a long way toward reassuring skeptics that the Administration was anxious to put ERP on a businesslike basis. The best proof that Europe was willing to do the same had come, as it had to, from abroad.

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