All or Nothing

Secretary of State George Marshall went up the Hill last week to tell Congress what it should give him, in money and authority, to make his European Recovery Program workable. He went confidently, as the acknowledged master of relations with Congress. As wartime Chief of Staff, he had always got pretty much what he wanted, with few questions asked, with almost no haggling. Congressmen had a deep respect for General George Marshall.

The integrity and dignity of the big soldier-diplomat dominated the marble caucus room. George Marshall was, as always, firm but courteous, patient and persuasive. His flat monotone carried a note of determination.

He was, as always, conservative in his estimate of success. This "unprecedented endeavor," he said, would be "neither sure nor easy . . . against the avowed determination of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party to oppose and sabotage it at every turn." But, in his now familiar phrase, it represented the "calculated risk." He calculated that it would require every penny of the $6.8 billion that he and President Truman had set as the cost of the program for the first 15 months.

George Marshall went on to the attack. The $6.8 billion was not just an "asking figure," purposely padded in anticipation of congressional cutting. Clenching his fist, he demanded that Congress provide this "adequate" amount or reject his entire proposal. Said he: "An inadequate program would involve a wastage of our resources with an ineffective result. . . . Either undertake to meet the requirements of the problem or don't undertake it at all."

"Two Secretaries." He was just as determined that there should be no divided authority in administering the Plan. The final responsibility must remain with the Secretary of State. To those who might argue for an independent organization, responsible to Congress, Secretary Marshall said: "There cannot be two Secretaries of State."

On those two points, the Secretary was adamant. No Senator tried very hard to shake him. He went back down the Hill. Behind him he left the impression that, if he did not get substantially what he had asked for, he would resign and go back to his pleasant colonial house in Leesburg,Va.

The next morning he hastily called a press conference to deny that he had any intention of resigning. But that afternoon he got a shock. Georgia's mild-mannered Senator Walter F. George, one of the committee's most influential Democrats, delivered it:

"I don't think the State Department is justified in presenting these absolute alternatives. That is a method of propaganda that I don't appreciate.

"We're told here flatly that $6.8 billion is necessary and that we must do the whole thing or no part of it. That is not a proper statement to make before the legislative branch of the Government.

"Suppose we decide that $6 billion is enough. I don't believe that would prove absolutely fatal to the program."

"Sterile Results." George Marshall had made a grave tactical error and Walter George had called him on it. With the gates of criticism opened, senatorial skepticism flowed freely. Marshall had left Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas behind on the Hill to answer questions. Lew Douglas had three uncomfortable days. Democrats and Republicans alike began to shoot at him. Arthur Vandenberg told Douglas flatly that he and Marshall had missed the key point: "You must get the confidence of the American people or you are sunk without a trace." Said Vandenberg: the U.S. people "have a feeling that foreign grants in aid since the war have had pretty sterile results. They want to be sure that this program is going to be a success where others failed, that there is going to be a new element of business responsibility injected into this formula . . . that this is going to be conducted in a businesslike way."

This week George Marshall went up the Hill again--to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He did not compound his error. This time he asked for an "adequate" amount, heeded Senator Vandenberg's injunction and promised "business management" of the European Recovery Program.

The first week's hearings did not mean that ERP was in danger of being junked. But they did mean this: Congress, aware of its responsibilities and prerogatives, was in no mood for take-it-or-leave-it attitudes; ERP would have to be the product of compromise.

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