Well, You Decide

While Russia made decisions, Washington dawdled. There was no real leadership in the U.S. capital.

Excuses were made. The Paris reply to the Marshall Plan could not be studied in haste. Not everyone would agree on the extent of aid necessary. Election-minded politicians on both sides of the fence suspected that a truly realistic program might be too harsh for U.S. stomachs.

But whatever the excuses, there was no real effort to bring the U.S. people face to face with the crisis--a duty normally assumed by their President.

"We'd Like to Know." Early last week President Truman had summoned Congressional leaders to the White House. He posed the alternatives. Either the U.S. provides quick help for Europe, he said, or Communism will sweep across the Continent to the Channel. Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary Robert Lovett backed him up with a detailed description of growing Communist strength, and of the deepening despair of Western Europe. Then the discussion began. As recalled by several participants in the meeting, it went somewhat as follows:

Truman: That's the picture and it's up to you, gentlemen. We'd like to know now what you think about calling the committees and having the special session of Congress to handle this.

Senator Vandenberg: You've had five weeks to be thinking this over, and you want us to decide in five minutes. I don't think it's fair, Mr. President.

Minority Leader Ray burn: I had hoped very much, Mr. President, there would be no special session of Congress. Can't something be worked out?

Truman: It doesn't seem we can get the money any other way, Sam. Congress has got to act.

Majority Leader Halleck: Mr. President, I don't want to be put on the spot here. You must realize there is a growing resistance to these programs. I've been out on the hustings and I know. I think we should hear from our committees who are in Europe now. I don't feel that I can commit the House until Mr. Taber and the others return.

Vandenberg: The decision has got to be yours, Mr. President.

Senator Bridges: I feel that my committee [Appropriations] ought to see for itself first.

Truman: I do, too. But I do hope we can reach some decision on this and get things started.

Vandenberg: Well, Mr. President, we'll think it over. I realize the situation.

The President had come to the meeting with his own timetable. He proposed that the foreign relations committees of both houses meet on Nov. 1, to be followed by meetings of the appropriations committees on Nov. 15. Then Congress would be called in session for Dec. 1 and vote the aid by Christmas.

Senator Vandenberg warned the President of the overoptimism of this timetable. He pointed out that the President had asked for aid to Greece and Turkey by last April 1, had actually got it from Congress by July 25. The three weeks between Dec. 1 and Christmas, Senator Vandenberg said, did not provide a long enough time; one man could hold up everything with a filibuster.

The meeting ended on a compromise, with a tentative timetable worked out. Chairman Vandenberg summoned his Foreign Relations Committee for Nov. 10. The House Foreign Affairs Committee was called for the same time. Some time later in the month the two appropriations committees would begin to look over the cost: $580 million by President Truman's estimate, nearer $800 million by Bob Lovett's. But the question of a special session of Congress was still up in the air.

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