All-Out

U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall's policy of splendid isolation from the China civil war had led to a deadlock: neither the Government nor the Communists had enough strength for a knockout punch. As the opposing forces clinched wearily last week, China, bled white by the long struggle, took a new breath. The U.S.'s three-star General Albert C. Wedemeyer was on the way to see what could be done to retrieve the losses that followed from five-star General Marshall's indecisive decision.

Pattern in the North. In the South and West the Chinese Government's control was secure. The Government held some three-quarters of the country. But north of the Yellow River* (see map) it was all the Government could do to protect the big cities and keep the main rail lines open. The Chinese Communists, who lacked the strength to take Peiping, Tientsin or Mukden, controlled the countryside of North China and Manchuria. They could, and did, tear up rail lines (sometimes within ten miles of Peiping).

This was the picture in the main theaters of the civil war:

P: In Manchuria, the Government had 150,000 of its best regular troops, many of them trained and equipped by the U.S. for fighting Japs. They were strong enough to batter the Reds away from the rail lines at Szepingkai this month in a major engagement. But the Government was not getting much out of what it held of Manchuria. The big coal mines were shut down; the harvest could not be moved over transport lines broken by Communists.

P: At the base of the Shantung peninsula, the Government had even more regulars than in Manchuria. One great task was reopening the Tientsin-Nanking railroad. Yet, in the Shantung campaign, chasing Communists was like punching a sack of rice. The fist sank in, but the Communists bulged back instead of breaking.

P: Somewhere north of their former capital, Yenan, was Communist headquarters for all China. In that area the Reds had enough troops to threaten the recapture of Yenan itself.

Pattern in Nanking. Without waiting for Wedemeyer's appraisal, Nanking last week officially buried the notion that the war was going to be won in a matter of weeks or months, or settled by talks around a table. The theme now was "war to the death," as Nanking issued new mobilization edicts covering increased conscription, new taxes, wage and price control. The most optimistic talk was, "victory within a year," with a string of ifs.

To a new post, deputy commander of all Chinese ground forces, the Generalissimo named Lieut. General Sun Li-jen, trained at George Marshall's own Virginia Military Institute, in the class of '27. General Sun was well thought of by U.S. officers.

Chiang Kai-shek had made it clear that there would be no more peace proposals from him for awhile. In a radio message to the people, Chiang said: "In perversion, malignancy and treachery the Chinese Communists, indeed, are worse than any bandit, traitor or puppet in Chinese, history."

The Communists countered by calling Government leaders "war criminals." The Red radio blared: "Deliver them to the People's Courts. Confiscate their possessions."

* Diverted last winter into its pre-1938 course to the Pohai Gulf.

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