A VIEW OF RUSSIA

Would it actually be possible for the U.S., as many Americans believe, to gain Russia's trust by conciliatory moves? Recently, as this contention became more and more publicized, it was examined by an American who has concerned himself long and closely with the U.S.S.R. TIME herewith presents his prognosis and prescription:

People who think that the golden touch of their particular personality and the warmth of their sympathy would modify, to some important degree, the actions of the Soviet Government, are not only flying in the face of some of the most basic and unshakable of Russian realities. They are insulting the ideological firmness of men who have followed the sternest of doctrines since the days of their youth; followed it through extreme danger, through extreme hardship, and through the sacrifice of every other value known to human life. These men would not be grateful for the implication that they, the guardians of the Revolution, are a group of neurotic, wistful intellectuals, to be swept off their feet and won over from their holiest articles of faith by an engaging smile, a few kind words, and some gestures of self-abnegation on the part of the other fellow.

Figleaf. It would be a great mistake to underrate the importance of ideology in the official Soviet psychology. Ideology is the only positive feature in a regime which has otherwise brought little but harshness, cruelty and physical misery to the human beings who have fallen within the range of its influence. In the name of ideology, it has committed acts which, deprived of any ideological motive, could be classified only with the most stupendous crimes in the history of mankind.

Ideology is the figleaf of Soviet respectability. Tear it away, and the Russian leaders stand exposed as only the last of the long series of cruel and wasteful rulers who have driven a great people from one military ordeal to another throughout the course of centuries in order to assure the security of their own oppressive regimes. No one is more aware of this than the Soviet leaders themselves; and no one is more conscious than they of the terrible responsibility they bear to the doctrine of Marxism for the acts they have perpetrated in its name.

The realizations and recognitions which we would have the Russians make lie closer to the surface of the Russian mind than we might think. In fact, the more closely they approach the surface, the more violently the Russian tries to inhibit them and to conceal them by vehement protestations in the other direction. It is our business to help him with this problem.

In secret, though he would rarely admit it, this is perhaps what he wants from us more than anything else.

"Wait a Bit." In one of Chekhov's short stories, some city people, whom we may take as symbolic of the Western world, try to make friends with the peasants of a nearby village, only to be repulsed time after time. The last attempt is made by the mother of the family, Elena Ivanovna, who goes to the village with her little girl, and tries to have a heart-to-heart talk with the peasants. It is not successful. Here is what Chekhov tells us:

"Elena Ivanovna suddenly became timid. She turned pale and shrunk together as though she had been touched with something coarse, and walked away without saying another word. . . .

" 'Mistress!' Rodion called out, walking after her. 'Mistress, wait a bit. I want to tell you something. . . . Live along here, be patient, and everything will work out all right. Our people are good, peaceful. . . . Don't pay any attention to Kozov or to the Lychkovs, and don't pay any attention to Volodka, he is just a fool; he listens to whoever speaks first. The rest of them are all right. They have good hearts and they have good consciences, but they have no tongues. Wait a couple of years and you can have the school, and you can have the roads, but not all at once. . . . You have to keep after them and keep after them until you win them over.'"

Friendly Firmness. There you have our problem in a nutshell. It is not an easy one. It is complicated by the fact that those who, like the Russian, do not want his worst traits pandered to by people in this country on whom the kindest comment would be that they were well-intentioned. On the other hand, intelligent and realistic people must not lose patience with the Russian too soon.

The problem, you see, is basically his problem, not ours. We cannot solve it for him. We can contribute only by a long-term policy of firmness, patience and understanding, designed to keep the Russians confronted with superior strength at every juncture where they might otherwise be inclined to encroach upon the vital interests of a stable and peaceful world; but we should do this in so friendly and unprovocative a manner that its basic purposes will not be subject to misinterpretation.

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