The China Statement

Anyone who wanted to get a line on General Marshall as Secretary of State could profitably read his 1,800-word farewell statement on China. It reflected a man of patience, firmness and devotion to fact, a man who would try to be fair at all costs. It also reflected the temper of a man who could get indignant but still speak with determined moderation.

In a long year in China, General Marshall had plowed through the Chinese political jungle, filled with "almost insurmountable and maddening obstacles." He did not want to leave the U.S. with any illusions about what he had found on his journey.

The great block on the road to peace in China, said he, was the "complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist party and the Kuomintang regard each other." Against it, all U.S. attempts at mediation had been stopped cold.

Close to Anger. Responsibility for the deadlock he placed squarely on the shoulders of extremists in both factions: "On the side of the National Government . . . there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition Government."

Even more to blame, he implied, were "the dyed-in-the-wool Communists." The General bluntly refuted the theory, often advanced by hopeful U.S. leftists, that China's Communists are simply agrarian reformists. Said he: "The Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type."

To accomplish these traditional Communist ends, China's Reds are prepared to use traditional Communist means. Yenan's ruthless strategy is as old as Lenin's: "The Communists, by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest, are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications--regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people."

On another Communist tactic General Marshall came close to open anger: "I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government, [Communist] propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans."

Hope for Unity. The only hope that General Marshall could see for China was the rise to power of what he called the liberals from the Kuomintang, from the minority parties, and from among those

Communists who had joined the party out of sheer disgust at governmental corruption. Said George Marshall: "Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government'."

By thus drawing a clear distinction between Chiang himself and the reactionaries of his Kuomintang, General Marshall was challenging every U.S. party-liner and most U.S. "liberals." It was also a warning to Chiang to divorce himself from the die-hards of the Kuomintang. Above all, it meant that U.S. policy, unsuccessful as it had been so far, would still be geared to the legal Government of China.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.