Big Four (1940)

Russia's interest in the Dardanelles and the Middle East is not one of adventurous postwar opportunism. It antedates the Communist Revolution, and will not be abated (though it may be hushed) by Western "firmness and patience." To gain the Dardanelles and the Middle East, Russia was actually willing in 1940 to join the Axis and in 1943 to sign a separate peace with Germany. This is not rumor or speculation; it is fact set down in black & white detail in documents captured in Germany and now in the hands of the U.S. State Department. The story these documents tell was mentioned (and suppressed) at Nuernberg. It was mentioned again (but not told) in the House of Commons. It is not a pretty story, but it is a very important piece of history. Here it is:

"Without Friction." On Oct. 13, 1940, just after Germany, Italy and Japan had signed their tripartite pact, Russia was asked to make a fourth. Ribbentrop wrote Stalin a 19-page letter outlining Nazi views and inviting him to send Molotov to Berlin to develop "a common foreign policy." On Oct. 21, Stalin thanked Ribbentrop for his "very instructive analysis" and said Molotov would reach Berlin on Nov. 12.

When Molotov arrived, Ribbentrop led him to Hitler, who began by saying that since Britain would soon admit defeat, it was high time the Big Four (Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan) divided the British Empire. Hitler added that as Germany and Russia had already settled their spheres of interest in eastern Europe "without friction," they should have no trouble settling bigger problems. For example, would Russia like an exit to the free, warm sea?

Southward Ho! After this auspicious start, Ribbentrop and Molotov quickly drafted a plan to make Russia a fourth major member of the Axis. They also agreed that the agreement confirming this should have two super-secret protocols.

By the first protocol, Germany's slice of empire was declared to lie "in South and Central Africa," Italy's "in North and Northeast Africa," Japan's "in East Asia to the South of her present empire," and Russia's "to the South of the territory of the Soviet Republics in the direction of the Indian Ocean" (see map).

By the second protocol, Germany and Italy agreed to give Russia additional rights--but not bases--in the Dardanelles.

Molotov took these drafts back to Moscow. The Kremlin apparently decided that the deal was not good enough. On Nov. 25 Molotov called in Count Friedrich Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, and said that Russia would not sign the Axis agreement unless:

1) The first protocol was amended to give Russia specifically "the area south of Baku and Batum in the direction of the Persian Gulf";

2) The second protocol was changed to "include the granting of bases for the U.S.S.R.'s land and sea forces at the Bos-phorus and Dardanelles";

3) A third secret protocol was added to give Russia special rights in Bulgaria.

"Entirely Different." Schulenburg reported the new Soviet demands to Berlin. For several weeks the Nazis kept a diplomatic silence. When Molotov pressed for an answer in January 1941, he got a curt note: "The German Government adheres to those ideas proposed to Herr Molotov at the time of his visit to Berlin."

A month later, after further negotiations on Bulgaria, Hitler finally decided to invade Russia, and alerted the Wehrmacht. What stuck in the Nazis' craw was that the increased Soviet demands added up to control of southeastern Europe and the Middle East.

Last Soundings. The Nazis soon overran southeastern Europe themselves, but at Stalingrad and El Alamein Russia and her new allies kept them from closing their pincers on the Middle East. By the fall of 1943, when the Nazi decline was well started but the Big Three had not yet reached the military agreements of Teheran, Berlin sent soundings to the Kremlin for a separate peace. Moscow gave the Germans the impression that the U.S.S.R. would sign if Berlin would meet these demands: 1) recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic states; 2) Russian control of the Dardanelles; 3) Russian expansion south and east to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea; 4) German support of Soviet demands for control of Dairen, in Manchuria.

Again negotiations broke down when the Germans refused to give Russia control of the Middle East.

In the end, the Russians bought with their dead and their victories and their brusque diplomacy more sway in eastern Europe than they had asked of Hitler. But the Dardanelles and the Persian. Gulf became Russia's main postwar objectives (see above). Those goals, the keys to the whole Eastern Hemisphere, are further off today than they were in 1940, 1943 or the spring of 1946.

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