Action

Ashamed of its unrealism and delays, frightened by the spread of famine, the Truman Administration at last met fact with action. When action came, it was drastic. This week the U.S. miller, baker and plain citizen finally knew that famine abroad would mean sacrifices at home. But the U.S. farmer again got what he wanted out of world shortages: a higher price.

The Administration's measures to get grain off farms and into ships went against its anti-inflation price-stabilizing principles. They were born of "dire necessity," said Agriculture Secretary Clinton Anderson. They call for:

P: A Government-paid bonus of 30-c- above the ceiling for each bushel of wheat delivered by farmers before May 25. A similar bonus was offered for 50,000,000 bushels of corn.

P: Flour milling for domestic use cut to 75% of that ground in the corresponding 1945 period--the remaining 25% to be earmarked for export.

P: A 25% reduction in use of wheat by bakers and food manufacturers.

P:Government purchase of an unlimited amount of oatmeal and whole oats for export.

The Pinch. The main goal was to pull off farms and out of elevators about one-third of the nation's storage of 375,000,000 bushels of wheat and to get it on the way to famine-threatened areas in the next three months. Would these measures at last bring out the wheat and other grains? The next two weeks might supply the answer. Grain men generally believed that farmers would release supplies slowly, but the 30-c- incentive would bring out an increasing supply.

But would enough wheat come out to make the 25% milling-for-export order more than a mere hope? Millers were skeptical. Few large millers are now operating at 75% of their 1945 capacity rate; many are producing less than half the flour they turned out at this time last year.

This week U.S. housewives would begin to feel the pinch. A cut in bread deliveries was the bakers' first step. Until bakers could set their ovens and machines to produce lighter loaves, until they could shift more flour from pastries and other products, there would probably be a bread shortage in many communities. But all these measures were by hindsight. They would add no kernels to the grain the U.S. had promised to deliver to the famine lands. At best, they would do no more than avert a failure to meet U.S. commitments.

The U.S. citizen was not alone in sacrificing. Britain, Canada, even abundant Argentine set in motion plans to tighten their citizens' belts, increase their food contributions to prevent a world tragedy (see INTERNATIONAL).

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