A Bet on Peace

Last week TIME'S London Bureau cabled: "Britons are asking about and talking about war in a dreadfully matter-of-fact way--two years, five years, what will you bet?" On the Continent the schism between Russia and the West was forcing the great mass of moderate men into two opposing camps, with the extremists in both getting ready for "when war comes." As Jimmy Byrnes and Arthur Vandenberg spoke of a stronger U.S. foreign policy (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS), war talk was also heard in the U.S.

Men's fear had been sharpened anew last week by such varied signs of Russian aggressiveness as her pressure on Iran, and Manchuria (see FOREIGN NEWS), her continued use of Communists in other countries for Russian ends, and a strongly documented report from Vienna by New York Timesman John MacCormac on Russian tactics that had killed any early hope of restoring Austria's independence.

Stand to Take. Prime Minister Attlee said last week in the House of Commons: "We have to keep a [war] potential running while the world is in its present condition. . . . We learned that after the last war."

That sounded like a new note of British resolution. How much Russian pressure would peaceful Britain stand? Four points seemed certain; Britain will not: 1) abandon Iran to Russia; 2) admit Russia to dominance in the southern or western Mediterranean; 3) waive her right to a western European grouping; 4) peacefully Accept any Russian move which directly weakens her Empire position.

Britons welcomed the Byrnes and Vandenberg speeches as at least indirect backing. Though the U.S. was not likely to guarantee the British Empire against rising colonial peoples, minimum U.S. interests require that Russia does not replace Britain in any major area which Britain may relinquish.

Chips to Cash. Until she reaches the point where Britain and the U.S. are really ready to resist, Russia will try to cash every chip she can while the world is still unsettled. The men in the Kremlin, who have an eye for history and long-range trends, know well that Russia can expand far more readily in the unsettled 19405 than in the 19505, when the peace treaties will have been written and the world's pattern solidified.

The 1960s and 1970s may be another story. By then Russia will have erased the ravages of war and made the great industrial expansion Stalin has laid down for the next three five-year plans.

At least until 1960, Russia will be much weaker than the U.S. For that reason Russian policy will be to avoid a major showdown.

Unless the U.S. suicidally weakens her own strength, turns isolationist, falls prey to internal disintegration, or, worst of all, gets confused and cynical about her own moral and political principles, a major war is unlikely in the next fifteen years. Beyond that observers could not see so clearly. But as W. Averell Harriman, retiring U.S. Ambassador to Russia, said this week: "There will be no war if we, as a country, remain strong, physically and spiritually."

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