Paradox

The U.S. press suddenly boiled with reports, speculation, protests about the doings in China (see FOREIGN NEWS). By what right were U.S. airmen, marines and sailors intervening in a civil war? And what of the British in Java, using U.S. Lend-Lease weapons with the labels removed?

The answer was simpler than the commanders' problems were. Months before V-J day, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington foresaw the enormous complexities involved in taking the surrender of some 5,000,000 Jap troops and civilians, scattered from Manchuria to Java. On V-J day all Allied commanders --U.S., British, Chinese -- in the Asiatic theaters had a directive instructing them to 1 ) do anything necessary to facilitate the Jap surrender; 2) rescue and protect Allied personnel and property; 3) do all this without involving Allied personnel or arms in "fratricidal strife."

Every move so far, from Dairen to Batavia, has been according to orders and according to plan. The British went to Java to take the surrender of the Jap forces and protect Allied (i.e., Dutch) lives and property. In doing so they found themselves fighting Indonesian Nationalists who are not Allies and are against the Dutch. Chinese troops moved into Indo-China -- but only into the area which was part of the China theater -- and found themselves supporting the French restoration. U.S. airmen, marines and naval forces transported and supported their Allies, the Chinese Nationalists, only in areas where there were Japs to be surrendered and disarmed. (At the important port of Chefoo, for example, Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey backed away, declined to land because the Communists had al ready disposed of the Japs there.)

U.S. commanders in China were perfectly aware that they were carrying out the U.S. Government's pledges to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. They also knew that Washington took the orders to stay out of "fratricidal strife" very seriously, and that they might be in trouble both with Washington and with the uninformed U.S. people if Americans got killed in the process. Up to this week, none had been killed by Chinese fire.

U.S. commanders did not relish their paradoxical position. Lieut. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander in the China theater, had discussed his difficulties in Washington, urging a clearer directive and a more forthright policy. He did not get what he wanted. Last week, on his way back to China, the General did some public thinking about the U.S. stake in China's civil strife. "There is no doubt," he said, "that the turn of events in an area embracing half the world's population must inevitably affect our country--economically, psychologically and perhaps militarily." In Shanghai Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid said: "We are not just laying bricks. We are building a house. We want to put the Government's armies where they can bring peace to China."

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