Crisis

As the Japanese prepared to lay down their arms in China, Yenan crackled with defiance. Communist Commander in Chief Chu Teh roughly rejected the nominal authority of Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. To Chungking he wired: your order not to take independent action in accepting Japanese surrender (TIME, Aug. 20) "does not conform to the national interest. . . . You have issued the wrong order, very wrong, indeed, and we have to reject it resolutely."

Cried Radio Yenan: "Chiang Kaishek, the Fascist chieftain . . . whose policy has been to sit aside and watch others fight . . . really has no right to accept a Japanese surrender. . . . Reactionary . . . stupid . . . sinister plot ... to instigate civil war."

Communist Goal. One day claims were put forth that the Communists spoke for 100,000,000 Chinese; next day the figure soared to 260,000,000 (a year ago it was 80,000,000). Communist troops pushed into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, neared Peiping and Tientsin. It looked as if control of all China north of the Yellow River was the Communist goal.

To the Japanese High Command in China, General Chu Teh sent an ultimatum: their forces in north, central and south China must surrender only to the Chinese Communists. To the U.S., Russian and British Ambassadors in Chungking, Yenan sent a memorandum: the Chinese Communists must be represented at the formal surrender of the Japanese; U.S. Lend-Lease to the Central Government must stop immediately.

The good, grey New York Times summed up the situation in a stinging editorial: "The Chinese Communists . . . are in open rebellion against President Chiang Kai-shek and his Government; they repudiate his order . . . which they are pledged to obey. . . . They want domination. They are not a political party; they are a conspiracy to seize the Chinese Government. And they consider the victory of the United Nations, in which they played a microscopic role, as their great opportunity."

"I Humbly Invite." In Chungking, Generalissimo Chiang held tense conferences with U.S. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of all U.S. forces in China, and with U.S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. Then he moved swiftly.

U.S.-trained Chinese armies were readied to reoccupy key cities as soon as the Japanese gave up. U.S. air forces stood by to transport them. The Central Government appointed mayors for Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Peiping, Tientsin and a governor (General Hsiung Shi-hui) for Manchuria's strategic Kwantung Peninsula.

A note was dispatched to the Japanese Commander in Chief in China, General Yasuji Okamura: "Cease hostilities immediately . . . send representatives to receive military instructions from General Ho Ying-chin, Chinese military chief of staff. . . . Japanese troops are temporarily permitted to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order."

Then the Generalissimo made one more try for unity. To Yenan's leader, Mao Tse-tung, he wired: "May I humbly invite you to come to Chungking immediately? We will discuss things in person. This involves our national welfare. Please do not decline. Yours most anxiously. . . ."

"I Shall Consider." Tension mounted, eased, mounted again. Japan's General Okamura accepted Chungking's order, promised to surrender formally this week. Central Government troops moved into Canton, waited on Shanghai's outskirts. The Chinese puppet chief at Nanking, Chen Kung-po, promising to "atone for my sins," transferred allegiance to Chungking, put "1,000,000 soldiers" in the Yangtze valley at Chiang's disposal.

From Yenan came Mao's reply to Chiang: "I shall consider the question of meeting you after you express your opinion about General Chu Teh's telegram." This was followed by another telegram from Chu Teh, demanding Communist co-authority to receive the surrender of Japanese forces. "You must publicly admit your mistake," said Chu Teh to Chiang, "and publicly retract your order. . ..." The alternative: civil war.

Treaty of Friendship. While Chiang grappled with "open rebellion," his brother-in-law, Premier T. V. Soong, hurried from the Kremlin to the White House. On & off since early July, he had been talking in Moscow with Generalissimo Joseph Stalin and Foreign Commissar Viacheslav Molotov. In his pocket Premier Soong carried a signed treaty of friendship and alliance between Russia and China.

Its terms, not to be published until after ratification, were a top diplomatic secret. While the world guessed at them, a Paris source reported the course of the talks and the terms in detail:

Stalin and Molotov had first demanded that China recognize the "independence" of Russian-dominated Outer Mongolia, which China claims. China must also allow certain provinces of Inner Mongolia to unite with Outer Mongolia. (On this point Stalin was adamant.) Manchuria must have a "very liberal autonomy"; China must acknowledge Russian interests in the province and settle Russian claims to the strategic Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. The Russians suggested "considerable autonomy" for Sinkiang, with "rectification" of its frontiers in favor of neighboring Soviet Asia.

In return, Moscow agreed to support Chinese claims to territories which "foreign countries have succeeded in tearing away from China." This probably meant British Hong Kong. British-influenced Tibet, and French Indo-China. Moscow proposed to assist China in economic reconstruction by sending technicians, supplying heavy-industry materials, rebuilding communications, and establishing airlines. Russia would have the right to use certain Chinese airfields.

Internal Affair. Premier Soong, according to Paris, asked that Russia recognize the Chungking Government as the sole government of China; that Russia stop all deliveries of arms to the Chinese Communists and prevent Japanese arms from falling into their hands; that Russia must not support the Chinese Communist request for Generalissimo Chiang's removal.

Stalin and Molotov argued that the Chinese Communists were a Chinese internal affair and that Russia could not be responsible for Yenan. But they would "use their influence" to help avert civil war. Stalin and Molotov believed that Chiang's retirement would help to pacify China.

With Soong delicately avoiding the Chiang issue, the treaty of friendship and alliance was finally signed.

A Price for a Chance. If this report was true, Russia had in effect advanced her frontier to the Great Wall. The Chinese Communists were free to take any action they chose. But the Manchuria settlement was a gain for China.

For this, Washington reports credited the U.S. When news of the Russian terms to China reached the U.S. delegation at Potsdam, they insisted that the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchuria railroads become common carriers, free for all nations to use. The U.S. also insisted that the Open Door policy apply to Port Arthur and Dairen. Russia agreed.

In Washington, where Premier Soong conferred with President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes, there was widespread feeling that China was dissatisfied with the Russian pact. This was by no means certain. For Premier Soong's treaty had won for Chiang Kai-shek a breathing spell in which China's Government could strengthen itself. How successful the breathing spell would prove depended in part on how much support--economic, financial and diplomatic--China would get from the U.S.

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