The Iron Cross

The Germans managed their surrender with a skill which will plague the victors for years to come. No Wehrmacht campaign was ever planned to deadlier purpose, executed with greater cunning.

The Mission. The twilight rulers of Germany preached to the last that the German people and armies were the enemies of Russian Bolshevism, the defenders of western civilization. Upon this powerful and insidious theme, they based the whole edifice of surrender.

The Strategy. To a disturbing degree, they succeeded in their strategy of separate surrender. True, a Russian signed the first general surrender at Reims; British and U.S. officers signed the second in Berlin (see WORLD BATTLEFRONTS). But Reims was General Eisenhower's show. Berlin was Marshal Zhukov's.

British and U.S. army commanders in the west had no choice but to accept the "field surrenders" of German armies--a process climaxed by the surrender of The Netherlands, Denmark and northwestern Germany to Field Marshal Montgomery. The fact that U.S. armies had been deliberately halted in their advances toward Berlin and Prague, so that the Red Army could take them, was so much grist for the German mill.

The scheme of separate surrender was no artificial fabrication; it had its roots in the fears and beliefs of the German soldiery and people. On the U.S. First Army front, many German units seriously expected to join the U.S. battle line, march with the Americans against the Russians. An entire German regiment had kept its arms with this end in view, was genuinely astonished when the Americans declined to cooperate.

The Alibi. The bankrupt Reich's receivers did their utmost to absolve the German people and the German military command of responsibility for the war and the defeat. Blame went impartially to: 1) the Nazi party, no longer to be confused with the German nation; 2) an "unfortunate" shortage of equipment. This inferiority, the propaganda suggested, was no reflection on the power and genius of German arms and could be corrected next time.

The Germans disclosed and carried out their strategy with atavistic frankness. One after another, surrendering generals spoke their pieces:

P:| General Alfred Jodl (at Reims): "The German people and armed forces .... have achieved and suffered more than perhaps any people in the world." P: General Franz Boehme: "We are unbeaten. . . ."

P: General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst: "Insane war . . . mad leadership."

P: Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, at last defeated and taken in Austria, notably broke the pattern insofar as he professed complete loyalty to Adolf Hitler, blamed defeat on both military and political bunglers. But, smiling and spruce and personally unbowed, he was a living embodiment of Wehrmacht "honor." P:I General Kurt Dittmar, theGerman ground forces' prize analyst, was asked by his U.S. and British captors to write a speech for broadcasting to the defeated Germans. He did, but it was not used: he had composed a masterful exoneration of the Wehrmacht.-

But General Eisenhower knew the score. Probably following a Big Three policy adopted long ago, he and the Russians did not repeat the Allies' mistake at the end of World War I in letting German civilians sign the general surrender. This time, only German military men were allowed to sign. Despite all their maneuvering, their responsibility was on history's record.

The Admiral of Flensburg. The chief instrument and executor of German surrender policy was Grand Admiral Karl Dbnitz. In retrospect, his rise to this eminence of disaster was revealing.

All signs indicated that Heinrich Himmler, after Hitler the No. i symbol of Naziism, had handed over the reins only when, and because, his efforts to surrender separately had failed. Donitz was an ardent Nazi, but the Allies knew him chiefly as an all-too-brilliant naval commander. He, too, failed to win a separate peace, but he had the satisfaction of seeing most of his Navy give up to the British. Only after the last German step had been taken according to German plan was an Allied check placed upon the maneuvers of Donitz and his associates in the last German "government."

At the last, Donitz himself was apparently in British custody. But for days his Radio Flensburg had broadcast a fantastic hash of surrender announcements and anti-Russian propaganda.

Broadcasting "the last High Command communique of this war," the voice of Flensburg first saluted the German troops on the Vistula who had "gallantly" fought the Red Army "to the very last." To their commander went the last German decoration of World War II: diamonds for the oak leaves (with swords) on his Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. The voice continued :

"Since midnight all weapons have been silent on all fronts . . . thus ending a heroic struggle that lasted almost six years. ... In the end the German Wehrmacht succumbed with honor to enormous superiority. . . . Every soldier . . . may lay aside his weapon proud and erect and set to work ... to safeguard the undying life of our people."

Radio Flensburg capped its performance with an astounding broadcast in the name of Field Marshal Ernst Busch, one of several German officers designated to assist in the Wehrmacht's dissolution:

"By order of the Grand Admiral and in agreement with the British occupation authorities I have taken over command of Schleswig-Holstein and the areas occupied by the troops of Field Marshal Montgomery.

"It is my task to safeguard order and the civilian population in all spheres of public life. To carry out this task all military and civilian authorities in my sector have been subordinated to me. ... I expect unquestioned devotion to duty and obedience to this order. . . ."

Shocked authorities in London demanded an immediate explanation. Correspondents at Allied headquarters were told that events had simply moved too fast for the staffs to keep up with the defeated Germans.

Overwhelmed by the chores of victory, General Eisenhower's headquarters finally dispatched a general to Flensburg to supervise the broadcasts. In the long run, this muddle was probably a good thing for the conquerors: Radio Flensburg's true voice had plenty of time to speak the German piece so clearly that none could mistake it.

*Incidental discovery: Dittmar's voice was so poor that he used a "double" on the Berlin radio, practically never read his own works.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.