The Arms of the U. S.

Up to the start of the big push in Europe, the press was filled with bitter complaints that U.S. weapons are inferior to the weapons of the Wehrmacht. G.I. gripes ranged over everything from guns to winter camouflage dress. Mainly it focused on U.S. tanks.

One tank platoon commander, quoted by the New York Times's Hanson Baldwin, declared: "Whoever was responsible for supplying the Army with tanks is guilty of supplying material inferior to its enemy counterpart for at least two years or more." Associated Press's Wes Gallagher, in London, reported the angry reactions of men and officers "fed up with the statements coming out of Washington praising American equipment." A.P.'s Robert Eunson, with the Ninth Army, ironically summed up: "Our greatest asset, of course, is manpower."

Patently such statements as Eunson's were unwarranted. If they were true, the results would have shown in U.S. casualty lists, which were not out of line with the usual grim cost of war. But it was an inescapable fact, nevertheless, that the Germans had run ahead of the U.S. with some of their weapons.

The Terrible 88. One of the German weapons that had long been clearly superior was the 88-mm. gun mounted on heavily armored Tiger tanks. The hardhitting 88, which G.I.s have learned to fear more than any other single weapon and which German propaganda has exploited for all it is worth, had been in the German arsenal at the beginning of the war. It was well known to the U.S. Army long before it gave Germany another "superior" in the Tiger tanks.

But the Army's Ordnance Department was determined to build a better gun of its own. Instead of copying the 88-mm. piece, Ordnance continued to turn out 75s, 76s and 90s while it experimented.

It now has what it wanted: a new 90-mm. with a high velocity shell which will penetrate even the six-to twelve-inch frontal armor of the Royal Tigers. But this weapon, which has been in production for only eight months, was a tardy addition to the U.S. arsenal.

The T-26. In tank development, the U.S. has also been slow. Some Army officers long ago recommended a heavier tank than the 34-ton General Sherman on which Armored Force commanders still put their main reliance. U.S. tank theory was then--and still is: tanks should be light and fast, built chiefly to exploit breakthroughs.

Ranking Armored Force officers never believed the tank's function was to slug it out toe-to-toe with other tanks. But faced with the necessity of close infighting, many had to admit that for much infighting the U.S. did not have the best tank for the job.

The new 45-ton General Pershing (T-26) might be an answer--but again it was a tardy one.

The Enterprisers. The development of the German armory has been marked by great enterprise. German policy has been to try out new weapons in actual combat. Many of these untested weapons failed and a lot of German soldiers died in the course of the experiment. But the Wehrmacht was able to get on the field first with many a new design.

Right or wrong, the U.S. Army is ultra-conservative about its weapons. The Chief of Ordnance, husky, able, 58-year-old Major General Levin H. Campbell Jr., has speeded up the processes, but they are still slow.

Due Process. Ideas for new weapons are first screened by the Ordnance Technical Committee, headed by Major General Gladeon M. Barnes, engineering graduate of the University of Michigan.

Ideas that look promising are handed on to every branch which may be interested. When they have made all their recommendations, O.T.C. gives its approval for pilot models, and they are sent to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

There, under the supervision of hardboiled, West Point-trained Major General Charles T. Harris, every gun or vehicle is exhaustively tested and compared with enemy weapons in Aberdeen's museum of foreign material. Then a number of the weapons are made and sent overseas for trial in combat. Not until final revisions are made does Ordnance order mass production.

Many an Army man says there is too much red tape and delay in the process. Ordnance has an answer: it is not U.S. policy to use troops as guinea pigs; before a weapon is put in their hands, it must be right. It usually is, even if sometimes a little out of date.

O.K. with the Big Customers. Army Ordnance has the word of the top commanders that they are more than satisfied with the weapons they have.

One of Ordnance's jobs is to determine when soldiers' criticism of a weapon is based on fact and when it is just griping. In the case of the Royal Tiger and its 88-mm. gun, front-line criticism was impressively dismissed by fighting commanders, including Eisenhower and Patton, as a gripe. It was not until recently that field commanders decided the front-line men might be right and asked--but too late--for the T-26. There would not even be a token force of Pershings on hand now if Ordnance had not started building them more than a year ago.

The Rest of the List. For the rest of its job, Ordnance could claim more than a passing grade. It had the best rifle in the world--the Garand (which the riflewise Marine Corps had originally rejected after exhaustive tests, thus proving that there is more than one judgment to be made about any weapon). It had been first on the field with the bazooka.

U.S. artillery had been battle-proved as topflight; its grenades were at least as good as the Germans', probably better; its rolling stock, from jeeps to tank carriers, was better than any other army could hope to have. On total score, the U.S. Army was far out in front in quantity, quality and variety of weapons.

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