The Enemy's Hand

The pattern of thought underlying the Japanese tactics on Luzon became clearer last week. On the northeast flank, the enemy yielded nothing; every yard of uptilted ground captured by Major General Innis P. ("Bull") Swift's I Corps was bitterly contested. Under attack from both west and south, Rosario (see map) had been a no man's land for days, battered by naval, air and artillery bombardment, before it fell. Even from there, the road to Baguio would be uphill all the way. The Japs had big guns emplaced. Though some of these were knocked out, the enemy clung stubbornly to pillboxes and other fixed defenses. Most of the 1,017 Americans announced as killed in the first three weeks of the campaign had died in this sector, where the 43rd Division (Major General Leonard F. Wing) and the 158th Regimental Combat Team (Brigadier General Hanford MacNider) were fighting.

To the southeast, the 25th (Major General Charles L. Mullins) was probing toward Highway 5, on which there was heavy northbound enemy traffic. In a three-day battle, the "Tropic Lightnings," as the men of the 25th style themselves, took only half the town of San Manuel. The second half was not much easier--by-passed Japs held on for days.

Thus the enemy revealed his intention to defend, as long as life was in him, the natural stronghold of northern Luzon's mountains. This would delay U.S. use of airfields such as Tuguegarao and Aparri; it would keep U.S. ground forces away from Luzon Strait indefinitely, unless fresh landings were made.

Rolling In High. On the road to Manila, the Jap was still fading backward faster than any U.S. optimist had dared to hope. Major General Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps swept ahead, the 37th (Ohio) Division under Major General Robert S. Beightler on the left, and the 40th under Major General Rapp Brush on the right. With its flank protected by the Buckeyes, the 40th rolled into Clark Field in time for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to announce its capture on his 65th birthday. With more than a dozen runways, Clark was the greatest air base in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese had fortified 30 caves for its defense, yet they abandoned these, and confined their resistance to artillery fire from other caves in nearby hills. There were only sharp local actions, in which men died, honored but unsung. There had been as yet no major Jap stand on the road to Manila. That goal was almost within range of MacArthur's field glasses.

Thus the enemy revealed another part of his intention: not to risk any large part of his forces until it was clear whether General MacArthur planned other landings. There were two natural bottlenecks between Clark Field and Manila where small Jap forces could hold. And Manila itself, the Japs trumpeted, was being fortified street by street. The real battle for Luzon was not over; it simply had not begun.

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